REPORT RESUMES

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POWER AND AUTHORITY--EMERGING TRENDS AND ASPIRATIONS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE STANFORD-BERKELEY SEMINAR FOR JUNIOR COLLEGE PRESIDENTS (2D, BERKELEY, JUNE 19-21, 1964).

BY- MEDSKER, LELAND L. TILLERY, HARRY DALE
CALIFORNIA UNIV., BERKELEY
STANFORD UNIV., CALIF.

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FIVE PAPERS ARE REPRODUCED IN THIS REPORT. DR. DONALD D. JACKSON DISCUSSED THE CHANGING POWER STRUCTURE IN MODERN SOCIETIES, AS PREPARATION FOR THE EXAMINATION OF TRENDS RELEVANT TO CRUCIAL ASPECTS OF THE COLLEGE COMMUNITY. GORDON W. BLACKWELL DESCRIBED THE FORMAL POWER STRUCTURE, THE INFORMAL POWER STRUCTURE, AND AREAS OF TENSION IN STATE INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING. REASONS FOR STUDYING COMMUNITY POWER RECEIVED THE PRIMARY EMPHASIS IN MARTHA DERTHICK'S PRESENTATION, WHICH ALSO CONCERNED METHODS OF CONDUCTING SUCH STUDIES. BURTON CLARK DISCUSSED INTERNAL FORCES IN THE COLLEGE COMMUNITY, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ROLE OF FACULTIES. JOSEPH D. LOHMAN RELATED THE COLLEGE TO THE ASPIRATIONS AND REALITIES OF YOUTH AS THEY AFFECT VARIOUS ASPECTS OF POWER AND AUTHORITY. (WO)

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PROCEEDINGS

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Junior College Leadership Program
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
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INTRODUCTION

The theme for the second Stanford-Berkeley seminar for junior college presidents was suggested by the presidents themselves at an earlier meeting at Asilomar. "On every hand," the presidents said in effect, "there is evidence that new concepts of power and authority, both on the part of those who aspire to greater freedom and involvement and those to whom such aspirations are directed, are being developed and thus must be recognized in society at large as well as within educational institutions." Judging from the quality of discussions at the seminar, the choice of the topic was well-founded.

The junior college administrator, like his peers in other colleges and universities, faces demands from within his own faculty and student body for responsibility in making and executing educational decisions. But pressure also comes from the state and from diverse community groups. Some of these pressures may be disruptive if not destructive to the legitimate purposes of the junior college. Some, however difficult to understand and adjust to, are essential manifestations of our rapidly changing democratic society. It is this complex of aspirations and demands for authority which challenged the distinguished group of social scientists whose papers are published in these proceedings.

Each paper engages a major facet of the topic *Power and Authority--Emerging Trends and Aspirations*. In reading the papers one can conceive the lively discussions they stimulated at Stanford University on June 19-20, 1964. Dr. Donald D. Jackson placed the issue in broad context as he discussed the changing power structure in modern societies. Each subsequent speaker examined trends and aspirations relevant to crucial aspects of the college community. President Gordon W. Blackwell described and evaluated the meaning of power and authority of state-supported institutions. Professor Martha Derthick discussed methods of assessing community structures. Within this framework, it was then possible for Professor Burton R. Clark to focus on the prerogatives and power of collegiate faculties and for Dean Joseph D. Lohman to challenge the seminar as he analyzed the power and responsibility of youth, with particular concern for aspirations and realities.

The staffs of the Junior College Leadership Program at both Stanford and the University of California, Berkeley, express appreciation to the members of the Junior College Advisory Committee, which serves both programs, for their assistance in planning the second annual Presidents' Seminar.

Leland L. Medsker
Dale Tillery
University of California,
Berkeley

THE CHANGING POWER STRUCTURE IN MODERN SOCIETIES

Donald D. Jackson, M.D.

Stanford School of Medicine

Many of us tend to think of power as if it were the kind of near-absolute it was when sword length and physical strength were crucial determinants in human affairs. But if power is defined as the ability to influence relationships in a predetermined direction, then power in a society must represent the current values of that society. And, since they are created in a dynamic social system, values must change with consequent power shifts. One contemporary value and power source critically involves the educational field: I am referring here to the emphasis on scientific technology, a national disease which was endemic long before it burst into epidemic proportion when the first Sputnik rose toward the stars. The influence on education has been drastic, increasing its power position to be sure, but just as certainly changing its directions. The present high value on technology has also influenced the family unit (which is my area of professional interest), especially in terms of its already tenuous relationship to higher education. The power of technology as a value in itself and the consequences for the family and for higher education--especially at the junior college level--are the subjects I wish to touch on today. As I do so, I hope it will be obvious that my conceptual framework is one of systems: value and power systems, family systems, and larger social systems including the community and educational systems. Whatever the level of focus happens to be, the emphasis will be on the variety and complexity of interrelated parts, and the whole which is more than the sum of these parts. I have found that if one resists the temptation to oversimplify and to isolate, artificially, one factor from the many variables which impinge upon it, the accuracy of one's prediction increases, as does the potential for intervening and ameliorative actions.

Let us examine first my assertion that power--defined as the ability to influence relationships in a predetermined direction--is by no means absolute but depends on, and indeed represents, the values of the society and the era which are the context of this power. It is typically American that we think of power in terms of size and force, (which we seem to value so highly), and therefore as tangible and only finitely variable. Yet cross-cultural studies have indicated that "wars" have been won by the competitive accumulation of possessions, and by the competitive destruction of possessions, as in certain Northwestern tribes. In India, white cows have a power of which we must assume they are not fully aware; for though the value which both the Hindus and the cows place on the latter is not of the same origin, it is nonetheless a shared value and thereby places the cow in a position of power which she does not have, for instance, in the United States. Historically, we have seen that power in our civilization has rested in "Divine Right," when blood lines were highly valued; in military or political skill during times of strife or revolution; and in Trojan times, in the beauty of a woman's face. Even overtly physical power, as in a police state, depends on the shared values of the dictator and his victim. Arthur Koestler has described a fictitious sect of dissenters in a country which is obviously intended to resemble the Soviet Union under Stalin. This group of "fanatics" were known as the Fearless Sufferers. As the power of the dictatorship became unbearable, these individuals began to inflict upon themselves pain and suffering even greater than the coercive tactics imposed by their masters: They tortured and starved themselves, even murdered their wives and children, until at last there was no more suffering which could be imposed; death was only a relief. The regime capitulated and kept this sect one of its most closely guarded secrets, for the sect had succeeded in rejecting their power. They could only inflict pain and death on these dissenters and their loved ones; but the Fearless Sufferers were no longer respecters of these ordinary human values and thus were beyond the pale of the police state's capacity to coerce. (We might speculate whether the same will hold true when the full effect of the present "balance" of nuclear power is felt. It seems to me that unless we do actually take advantage of our respective capacities to annihilate the world fifty- or a hundred-fold, there must be a new international governor. For power must be based on a new shared value when that of physical warfare becomes meaningless.)

This extreme example, with its practical implications for the ultimate efficiency of sheer force, leads me to my next point. Values, by their very nature, are subject to change and hence the power sources and the distribution of power in a society change. This is partly because of the fact that power rests on shared values and is thus vulnerable to change on either side. If A uses ploy x to influence B to do y and is successful (i.e., has power), then after the establishment of this pattern, A-x B-y, A-x B-y, etc., A cannot know whether the sequence is punctuated A-x B-y or B-y A-x. I am reminded of Richard Llewelyn's story about the dubious power of being Gandhi's jailer. Following a particularly long, isolated incarceration in a dark cell, Gandhi put his arm around his keeper's shoulder and told him to try not to feel so bad.

Increasingly during the past decade or so, technology and technological feats and skills have become valued in our society. When, as educators, we face the challenge and promise of our burgeoning technology, we must be aware that if we jump on this bandwagon without reservations or precautions, we confirm what I believe to be a confusion between science and technology and thereby abet an unprecedented shift in power in our society. The pride and passion for weaponry and gadgetry have already influenced education and have tremendously changed the power structure in our country. In this regard, I have two small questions: In your local newspaper, how many times this year have you seen photographs of the boy or girl who won the science prize for some clever gadget in contrast to a picture of the student who won the poetry prize? Second, has it crossed your mind that the physicist may have little in his background that prepares him for participation in crucial policy decisions which increasingly fall to him? With these problems in mind, let me next give you my views of the relation of education to the family, and of the relation of technology to education in general, along with some specific suggestions for the role of the junior college in this dilemma.

What I would like to do first is to relate something about the family as a system, especially as a communicating system, to the problems that face educators like yourselves, and finally to the importance of the junior college. If the connections between these topics seem a bit wispy, I ask you to tolerate the ambiguity for awhile, and perhaps it will not be for some time that you realize I have made very little sense.

The family probably arose with the advent of tall grasses and the ability of our ancestors to vocalize in redundant patterns. The hunter could range for game and return to the women and children with the aid of vocal signals. Through repetition, certain patterning of symbols made sense and not just noise. The father probably had little recognition of his own offspring and probably also had multiple indiscriminate matings, so that the mother assumed responsibility for her own offspring. It would seem sensible if early tribes developed where children were cared for in a communal way and women took turns at the cooking, skinning and wood-gathering, but I doubt very much if our forefathers were this clever. We don't get along well enough today with each other to lend much creditability to early communal living for our smaller brained forefathers (or our smaller forebrained fathers). Probably the uncertain and ranging climate leading to nomadism forced a kind of tribal organization which constantly was reinforced with killings and head-bangings until there was established the notion that the bad guys were out there and we were the good guys, and for heaven's sakes, don't rock the boat. Other factors tended to push people together, including things like fire pits, sheltering caves which meant close living, predators, common utensils, and finally the development of myths and religions, which formed bondages and emphasized the need for them. Finally, agriculture and less violent climatic conditions led to territoriality and the need for a system of social rules that would encompass both permanence and change.

The family prospered when systems of barter and exchange made it possible for the old man to spend more time at home, and it is difficult for any of us to even vaguely imagine what change came over the family system when the wise father began to know his own child. Now there were two parents, and with even one child there were three possible dyadic relationships. With two children, it increased to six possible dyads and twelve kinds of transactions, depending on who initiated the interaction; that is, father-mother, mother-child, child-mother, child-father, father-child, etc. With this kind of complexity, it was natural that rules of interaction should develop and that these rules should vary with the socio-economic and geographic factors that shaped the culture.

In some cultures where the birth rate was high and food scarce, children were held in esteem for what they potentially could do, and since girls would potentially bring only more children, they tended to have a bad time of it. The spartan cruelty of life gave special authority to the parents, and especially the providing male parent. The wife learned to exercise her power in more covert ways and somehow things worked out.

In some cultures where infant mortality was high, despite agricultural plentifulness, children were coddled and sometimes suckled until they were three or four years of age. They learned to respect their elders because the years were kind and growing old was a fine thing, and adults, not having to work all the time, could make music or objects, and there was dancing.

The fabulous natural abundance of America might have produced such a child-oriented culture, except for the fact that early Americans came from foreign cultures and made a practice of not learning from the Indians.

If I seem to have set out on a discursive, speculative path about the family, it has been to lead you to the present point: namely, that the course of educational practices has followed much the same developmental path as the family. First, there was the learning to be human. Then, the accretion of simple knowledge at the mother's hand; then the father and older siblings, who imparted more specialized or perhaps worldly knowledge; then the formation of increasingly complex rules as the family shared communal activities. One set of rules obviously necessary was the who, how and what regarding the child's education. This is a set of rules that has not yet been completely worked out--neither the family nor the community having a completely clear-cut role.

Note that according to the scheme of the family's development that I have sketched, it was and is inevitable that a complex matter would be the parents' rights regarding their offspring's education, and the community's rights. This recondite matter still plagues us, but note that this is not so immediately obvious where higher education is concerned. That is, the family traditionally removes the yoke from its young at eighteen years of age or thereabouts, and this is the age when young people start college. The larger and more revered the university, the smaller part does the parent play in his child's education, except to share mutual embarrassment and box lunches on Dads' and Daughters' Day or Moms' and Sons' or some often more stilted than festive lost weekend.

There is the feeling, with no real evidence of course, that one goes off by oneself for higher education, during which time a good deal of vital social maturation unquestionably takes place. Since the student is virtually separated from his nuclear family, this socialization and interpersonal learning is likely to be inadequate or highly distorted. The residential, non-local university must necessarily take over many parental or familial monitoring functions which it is not equipped or intended to handle. The number of suicides, serious emotional disturbances, and dropouts that occur among the already screened and intellectually competent youth might be an indication that our need for technically educated youth and youth's wild desire to know cannot take precedence over the need for social learning. Further, the student who is separated from a difficult or disturbed family context is not necessarily thereby freed to operate in academic independence. The William Alanson White Institute in New York maintains a clinic for the screening and treatment of college dropouts. Let me quote from their report:

> Our signal premise has been that the meaning of significance of an event lies in its relationship to its context; that is, we do not ask who drops out of college, but how college is experienced phenomenologically by the student who drops out. Our findings suggest that the primary context is still _intra-familias_, and that dropping out may be viewed as a restitutive act within a homeostatic family system. Rather than rebelling against the family, the dropout is playing an assigned role important to the maintenance of family equilibrium. Attempts at autonomy are resisted, and should the student successfully extricate himself, overt disturbance will appear in other members of the family. Subsequently, the student often manages to recreate in the college milieu, the same sacrificial participation in maintaining the equilibria of both his peers and college authorities... Dropping out of college may be considered a meaningful

> act that sustains important existing homeostatic equilibria in the triadic context of family, peers and college authorities.

Even the reasonably well-adjusted adolescent faces the difficult task of accomplishing vital social learning in a new and somewhat artificial context which is discontinuous with the original setting for this learning, which was the family. Furthermore, the power-value of technology has sharpened this problem. The accelerated pursuit of knowledge, which the highly selected university freshman undergoes, becomes as technology is to science if he is not socially prepared to utilize his knowledge in interpersonal relations and in relation to mankind as a whole. For example, it was my privilege to speak at a meeting where youthful science winners presented their projects. Their use of "facts" and "scientific information" to beat each other over the head was appalling. The instructors present commented on the virtue of the scientific methodologies, but not at all on the inexcusable bad manners and rampant insecurity being displayed. This spectacle further suggested to me that our current educational boom is apt to spawn a group of little old men who have the knowledge but not the heart to be leaders. Those of us in psychiatry are already well acquainted with the nuclear physicist or theoretical mathematician who seems to be a combination walking encyclopedia-Daisy Moon Beam. Psychiatrists in this area speak of the peculiar social phenomena of the electronic engineer who can adjust occupationally, as he is unusually well educated, but has little social preparation for life and often runs into marital difficulties or does his work so well he is advanced to an administrative position and cracks up because he cannot deal with people. His university course probably precluded opportunity for necessary social growth.

It is possible to conceive of a college which is not expected to add social responsibilities to its educational ones--some European universities, for instance. And it is possible to conceive of a college setting which does not necessitate these auxilliary functions, e.g., the junior college which remains an integral part of the community. Two years of intermingled academic and familial living seem to be a sensible form of transition from the family to the world at large, eliminating or at least softening the often competitive or mutually exclusive demands of social and educational learning. Ideally, the junior college could serve a function in the community system; it could be a nidus or locus of the amalgamation of social and educational needs in tandem. Initially, this is possible because of its unique locale and relative continuity with the community at large, which is not usually true of larger universities. But I strongly suggest that this natural role be emphasized and increased. A few possibilities would be to offer TV credit courses, to all ages, thus making education to some degree a family affair. Courses for adults as well as parent meetings and activities would be considered a natural part of the college's efforts. Hastings Law School in San Francisco has gathered an unusually fine faculty for a school of its size simply by hiring the grand old men of law who have been arbitrarily retired from other schools. Such a practice is not only a boost in prestige and faculty quality, but it rounds out the otherwise limited age range of the ordinary university, and adds the dimension of age and experience to the actual instruction. Education becomes timeless instead of reflecting our current value which is "work hard, get good grades and you'll graduate, make money, and never have to take a test again." This period of trial with adjustment or failure would enable the institutions next in line to know what they were getting, and the maturity of properly reared twenty-year-olds might be considerably above some of the freshman chaos they now face.

The increased emphasis on a technological education can be expected to amplify the already existing problems of the relations of the student, his family, and his institution of higher learning. I have suggested that the natural and more gradual transition which the junior college offers is one solution and should become a conscious part of junior college planning.

Technology is essentially "know how" and Americans have a world-wide reputation for getting things done so that technology has a spiritual as well as a practical appeal. The consequences for education of emphasis on technology have been written about by many authorities and range from the percentage of graduate students in the physical sciences compared to the humanities to the total college or university budget and the percentage thereof devoted to the school of engineering. There are, however, more subtle yet very real consequences which though they lie in the future must be considered now. The proportion of seniors in engineering receiving pre-graduation job offers is high. The salaries are competitive and more than those paid for most other jobs available to holders of B.A. or B.S. degrees. This allows seniors to consider marriage and child rearing somewhat earlier than they might have otherwise. Once they take this route, there is not apt to be much thought toward further education or long-range career plans. Among other ramifications obvious to you are such instances as the dilemma of the young man who thought he would teach math in high school until he considered the salary and the future and, thus, we have another contribution to the teacher shortage and the overwhelming female domination of primary and secondary education which in turn has obvious social consequences.

Technology creates gadgets and these gadgets include teaching aids. Teaching aids are most effective in those studies where human relatedness is not essential, such as calculus and the stress quotients of non-ferrous metals. It should be possible to cut the B.S. program in engineering to three years soon, and then bright twenty-one-year-old kids will start at five to six hundred a month. I won't bore you with further elaborations, but on your next sleepless night, I guarantee several fruitful hours can be spent reviewing other consequences for education of the current value assigned to technology.

The technological boom in education offers a more obvious challenge to those who plan curriculum and facilities, and that is the increasing tendency to provide for the demands of technological training to the neglect of the so-called liberal arts. If we accept the incredible value placed on sophisticated but inanimate hardware, we will certainly abandon to some degree the less tangible humanities and social sciences, or, worse still, we will force them into the mold which emphasizes product and not process, means and not ends, until they are little better than specialized technologies. I feel the place of the liberal arts in higher education is to provide goals and perspectives for the specific skills acquired in technological learning. This should be intimately linked with the realities of socialization of which I spoke above. It may be that evidence will point to the junior college as the needed hub for the educational wheel. Why? Because, again geographically, the junior college offers the best possibility of a bridge between the student's family life and his world life, as well as the potential for unspecialized smallness. The first two years of college should emphasize humanities and should take place in a context of intimacy appropriate to learning about people. The methods should be small group meetings, seminars and discussions, rather than the large lecture-type courses so common in universities. Under such a scheme, the junior college would be an integral part of becoming human and not a repository for high school bad grades or those too poor to move to universities. This scheme would tacitly acknowledge that the social evolution of the family is recent and continuing and remains an important source of power. The big think tanks are often too dispassionate or too non-involved for the late adolescent, and the very specialized skills which they offer should properly be reserved for those ready to receive them--emotionally as well as intellectually. I have been impressed with one educational experiment, namely, the practice of Antioch College of sending students away from the university for several months, during which time they carry on a field project related to their major interest. Those Antioch students I have met during this period have impressed me as looking for clues about living, about being human, and are not caught up in dictionarizing a shadow existence for themselves.

To recap: (1) The family has had a long social evolutionary process and is still attempting to adjust to communal living without losing its own identity. This process has not kept pace with technological changes, and the current thirst for hard facts has put extraordinary pressures on the family. (2) Education is apt to be confused with technology, especially in America where technological advances in science, especially weaponry, are regarded as essential to existence. However, education has another function which is related to humanizing, and it is this process which far outweighs the amassing of technical information, in my opinion, because the great games of the future will result from ideas, from creativity, and from processes which are inextricably linked to human collaboration.

Initially, I mentioned my interest in general systems theory as a predictive tool. This is how we approach the family in our research: as a total, interlocking system, with each member or subsystem influencing all other members and, further, existing within a larger social system. You will recall that the analysis of college dropouts I mentioned earlier was in terms of the student's family as a functioning whole. Many behavioral scientists including myself, who have taken this perspective of the individual and his family are quite excited about the approach. We have found we gain more comprehensive and accurate prediction about the behavior of the individual and the family group if we note system tendencies, that is, if we consider the whole of activities rather than limiting our vision to individual A, B, or C or event x, y, or z.

This holistic approach obviously has implications for larger social systems than the family. It has been applied to the psychotherapy situation, wherein the behaviors of patient and therapist have been described as an interacting whole. Hopefully, a descriptive system which will enable the therapist to understand the system he inhabits with his patient will also help him discover the most effective therapeutic interventions. In quite another field, Professor Robert North here at Stanford is applying the systems framework to the behavior of nations. By analysis of a large number of variables surrounding some of the major international crises of this century, he is discovering characteristics of international systems which give a wider potential range of prediction and which may increase the sensitivity of our present international observations. In discussing the effects of values and power of a certain kind, above, I have tried to construct a systems framework of many interlocking variables leading to change. In your administrative and planning work, most of you probably have a good intuitive feel for systems and systems prediction. Hopefully, I can formalize this a bit.

Since a system, by definition, involves more than one variable, ability to predict will depend on anticipating which combination of variables will have special "future" significance. For example, if one had anticipated that wars would remain an important occupation for men (and not women), and that the technology of weaponry would result in weapons that required manufacturing skills and which increased killing efficiency, then someone might have predicted several hundred years ago that women's inferior position to man would decrease. That is, what used to be considered a fundamental male-female difference, namely fighting, has gradually resulted in there being less of a difference in male-female status. For, as men went off to wars to be killed, the ratio of women to men increased at the same time that women were called upon (and were able, because of technological advances) to man the factories making the weapons for their soldiers. Parallel technological advances freed her from domestic chores and permitted a shift in her necessary function. The woman increased her status by her usefulness in what had been a male activity at the same time she increased in numbers. It is not surprising that following World War I, women achieved the right to vote in the U.S. The woman's position in the U.S.S.R. changed enormously following World War II so that, for example, nearly two-thirds of Russia's physicians are female, and in some wholly technical fields such as metallurgy Russian women have achieved significant recognition.

Obviously I am leaving out many other factors in this oversimplified example; this is intentional. I am trying to illustrate that selecting certain variables and assuming positive feedback (that is, an amplifying effect) to the system from them will result in the occurrence of so-called "step functions," or changes in the basic character of the system, and the occurrence of these step functions can to some extent be predicted.

Let me try an example in your field, education. As being highly educated gains increasing status for our populace it will result in further status increases because professors will act to augment this status position. This further augmentation will result in greater efforts to select scholars of the greatest potential and, since all such selection methods depend in part on values or current biases, it will gradually become apparent to educators that they are creating a group which involves more than the erudition quotient, so fifty years from now an educator will announce at such a meeting as this, "There are too many X's and not enough Y's and Z's among our students," and there will then be a change in the selection processes because the group will instantly realize this is correct. What will be the characteristics of the X group? I think it makes little difference because any "good" or "desirable" quality can be overselected to the neglect of certain other traits or abilities. But I should be sporting enough to make one prediction if only to again try to illustrate my point. The increase in teaching technology (teaching machines, television, etc.) will decrease the difficulty in learning foreign languages. These processes will be further implemented by weapon technology in countries other than the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., with a world-wide aspect to keeping the peace rather than the present dyadic balance. As students travel in foreign countries and speak new languages, they will lose or at least question some of the illusion of individuality which seems so characteristically American. The weakening of this illusion will result in greater interest in the humanities rather than in mathematics, physics, engineering and such subjects, which the student "masters" in an apparent aloneness. Increasing "world" awareness will result in interest in rules for living in the world and thus for a time, law (and possibly philosophy) will become the highest status professions.

Similarly, if we consider several variables such as increased leisure time, affluence, and life expectancy, in combination with increasing specialization and consequently longer and longer years of required education, we might begin to consider it a good idea, and a highly feasible one, to keep students in school and off the labor market until they are older and much more highly educated. To a certain extent, this is happening naturally; but planning for it would increase the efficiency of our curricula as well as make us aware of seemingly unrelated planning problems, such as the increase in marriages among our "aging" student population.

I am sure most of you can think of better examples of your specific planning problems. My point is to urge you to avoid what I call "univariant" prediction. If you change your tactics along only one variable, your efforts can be neutralized by any change along that line, and totally reversed by an additional change in any other factor. During World War II, the Office of Naval Research worked out a highly successful tactic for bombing submarines, based on the mathematics of topography. Thus, rather than bombing the entire section of ocean where the submarine was known to be, they assumed the sub would zig-zag in its course and therefore bombed only the diagonal path which would encompass the zig-zag. This, of course, saved a lot of bombs and greatly increased their hits--for a while. Soon the subs simply changed their traditional zig-zag pattern and the new tactic was useless. In fact, so committed were the Navy planes to the new method of bombing that the enemy submarines would occasionally travel openly unsubmerged in the midst of convoy without detection. If the planners had conceptualized the hunter and the hunted as a system, they would have realized that there would be a change in tactics by the enemy to match their original tactical change, and should have been ready with a new plan of attack and with the answer to the change in enemy tactics instituted by the new plan.

Similarly, college planners must consider not just buildings, teachers, and birth rates, but also social maturation, sexual mores, affluence, the effect of their own plans, etc.--factors which, _whether we like it or not_, may have as much or more influence on the changing character of higher education than what we usually consider our appropriate variables. The college must be defined as a sub-system existing in open state within a larger system of this society, this culture, this historical period. The basis for practical planning can be much larger than is usually conceived. The planner may not think such matters are his concern, yet all evidence points to an increase in the power position of higher education and its administrators, whether they wish it or not.

SUMMARY

I have tried to show that a current value, education for technological skills, occupies a strong power position in our culture and that this value will have certain long-term consequences which can be predicted according to a systems theory. One of the most important effects is the separation of the student from a social context necessary for basic interpersonal experiences.

I have suggested that the junior college can be a salutary influence on the current system since it provides a natural link between higher education and the family. Further, family power and human values in the current education scheme should be recognized and increased.

POWER AND AUTHORITY IN STATE INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Gordon W. Blackwell

Florida State University

In preparation for our discussion this evening, I read with considerable interest Logan Wilson's article "Myths and Realities of Institutional Independence."[1] Two passages struck me as particularly pertinent for our purposes. Wilson states:

> One of the facts of modern life we must accept...is that both private and public institutions of higher education are becoming more politicized. I do not use this term in an unsavory sense, but merely to denote undeniable claims of the larger society and the growing involvement of all levels of government with higher education.

President Wilson goes on to say:

> However paradoxical it may seem, it is clear that as a college or university grows in influence and power it becomes enmeshed in an enlarged web of relationships. Inherent in this involvement is the potential of compromised integrity and independence, so that closer surveillance and tighter internal organization are required as countervailing elements to offset centrifugal forces from extra-mural sources.

At this point I should like to suggest that what Mr. Wilson perceives with respect to four-year colleges and universities is equally if not more applicable to junior colleges.

Junior colleges are subject to direct local control. They are oriented more to a single community than to a state as a whole. Many constituents of a junior college live within the same local community as the college and have more frequent opportunity to observe the institution. Usually junior colleges are supported at least in part by local taxes. For these reasons, then, junior colleges often are even more enmeshed in the web of social forces in their immediate environment than are state colleges and universities.

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[1] Logan Wilson, "Myths and Realities of Institutional Independence," Graduate Comment, VII (April, 1964), 50.

Because we are a part of the environment in which we exist and because we are conscious of our relationships within this environment, presidents of state institutions of higher learning find themselves in a position similar to that of a father who is fearful that young men may make passes at his daughter but is even more fearful that none will want to. Every president desires that his institution capture the interest, support and attention of its constituents, but he does not want their interference.

The Formal Power Structure

In most parts of the country the day of the autonomous state institution is past. As population has grown and as public institutions have multiplied, the need for statewide planning and coordination in higher education has become obvious. Although some institutions and some presidents have tried to resist this movement--and a few may still look back with nostalgia to the halcyon days of complete independence from all save the legislature and the institution's own board--most of us have found this posture to be indefensible.

As institutions within public systems of higher education, we have a multitude of constituents who have the capacity to exercise legal constraints over us. Some of these constraints are proper. They do not constitute unwarranted interference. They are essential in our operation; we would be at a loss if they did not exist. On the other hand, some of our constituents have the capacity to exercise inappropriate constraints and unwarranted interference that impede our best efforts to achieve proper goals of quality education for our students. Such constraints give us real cause for concern. They would, if unchecked, deprive us of virtually every vestige of institutional autonomy and integrity. Whether or not such interferences exist for a particular college is a most important consideration in the determination of what kind of institution it will be.

As public centers of learning, our institutions usually are creatures of legislative bodies. These same bodies which create us have it in their power to nourish and support us or to maim and destroy us--either directly or indirectly. For whatever the reasons--and I sometimes suspect that unfortunately it is because of the tax dollars involved--legislators seem to show an intense interest in higher education. As administrators, it is our responsibility to respond to such interest and to undertake to guide it in positive and proper directions. It is the responsibility of the legislators to provide us with basic policies, and only basic policies, to guide us with reference to the growth, direction, and development of our educational institutions. Legislative activity should not go beyond the point of providing basic guidelines supported by adequate funds to accomplish the goals set forth. The creation of special legislative committees to pry into campus activities; the requiring of rigid, inflexible budgetary controls; the dictation of what shall or shall not be included in the curriculum; the specifying of which textbooks may or may not be used; the demand that a given student shall be admitted regardless of qualifications, or that a given staff member shall not be terminated even though equally unqualified--these actions constitute improper and unwise interferences by out legislative constituents. Many public institutions have been subjected to one or more of these pressures from time to time. Our ability to resist such pressures is one indicator of our autonomy and independence, and of whether we have been able to achieve a harmonious balance between proper supervision of a public institution and unwarranted political interference.

Another body of our constituents is the governing board composed primarily of laymen. In the interaction of lay boards and institutional administrators we see reflected some fundamental American concerns. On the one hand is the American insistence on know-how, competence, and professionalization. The administrators represent this tradition. On the other, the lay board reflects the basic American determination to keep matters of vital public policy in the hands of laymen. We have insisted that the professionals--whether five-star generals or college presidents--report ultimately to groups of lay citizens. We have been ever sensitive to Edmund Burke's warning that knowledge can be centralized but not power.

In exercising their appropriate and necessary supervision, these boards should recognize their responsibility to assist in the development of education by concentrating their efforts on such activities as the following: selecting and dismissing the president; determining the mission of the institution; formulating major institutional policies; considering budgets; presenting educational needs to legislative bodies; participating in ceremonial activities; facilitating the administration of the institution; promoting institutional uniqueness; providing informal advice to the president; furnishing creative leadership; interpreting and promoting higher education; and serving as a crying towel for the president. When a board successfully performs these functions, we witness a college president's dream come true, for these are proper activities of a governing board. On the other hand, when board members involve themselves in the internal administrative matters of an institution, the president's dream quickly dissolves into a nightmare.

A lay board that conscientiously carries out its proper function has a heavy responsibility. When we expect the board to serve a number of institutions within a system, we make the task much more complex. Although a central governing board is needed to insure coordination and direction for all a state's public institutions, we will find, perhaps, that we need in addition a board of trustees for each institution or each category of institutions (junior colleges, four-year colleges, universities). In my judgment, a separate institutional board working under the supervision of the central coordinating board would not weaken the authority of the central board. On the other hand, it would permit a lay group to work closely with each institution and to concentrate its efforts on analyzing and supporting the needs of each college or university and would give recognition to the individual character and identity of each institution. Each college or university is different; these differences can be made more meaningful if we have separate boards working within the framework of a central governing board.

The values and goals of colleges and universities must be determined by lay citizens and not by professional educators, but once the lay board has determined policy, the implementation of that policy is the responsibility of administrators. The lay governing board must provide the conditions--both in terms of social-psychological climate and other working conditions--that will attract to the institution the most competent administrative staff. Having determined goals and general policies, the board should leave the administration of the institution to the staff. The board should hold the president finally responsible for proper and effective administration. This separation of the making of policy and the implementing of policy is critical; such a pattern places proper responsibility on the board and on the administration. In this pattern each complements the other.

In addition to the board there are yet other parts of the formal power structure within which state institutions must function. Among these are the state budget director's office, the state personnel office, the state purchasing commission, and similar regulatory and fiscal control agencies. In only a few states are the public colleges and universities free from controls of such agencies. Frequently these inflexible controls handicap the college because the operations of educational institutions are different, if not unique, among state agencies.[2]

A final source of legal constraint for state institutions is the federal government through its many agencies which now have grants, contracts or loans to dispense to colleges and universities. While most of these programs are well conceived and do not violate institutional autonomy, these relationships with federal agencies are causing concern among thoughtful educators.[3] To cite but one example, when a university research scientist can transfer to another institution his federal grant of several hundred thousand dollars and research equipment valued at tens of thousands of dollars, something unusual has happened to his bargaining power in the academic market place. Furthermore, his professional identification comes to be with the sponsoring federal agency rather than with his university.

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[2] M. Moos and F. E. Rourke, The Campus and the State. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959.

Informal Constraints

In addition to the constituents that are ours by virtue of the legal framework within which we exist, other individuals and groups outside this formal structure have considerable influence on our institutional integrity and autonomy as state-supported institutions. These include parents, alumni, foundations, benefactors, accrediting agencies, professional associations, students, a variety of pressure groups, the faculty, and not the least, the general population of our host community.

All of these constituents reach out to sustain or defeat us in a variety of ways. They attempt to impose many of the same kinds of constraints as do those in the formal power structure, though generally without the same kinds of legal sanctions. With the best intentions and the highest motives, some would have us destroy outselves by ignoring the great academic tradition that is our heritage. Others with just as high motives and interest in our welfare would have us destroy ourselves by trying to preserve the status quo--staying squarely in the well-worn rut rather than providing leadership in a turbulent world. Still others of our constituents would have us destroy ourselves by striding forward with giant steps regardless of the consequences. Among these conflicting points of view, we must assume the authority and accept the responsibility to set our own course and move deliberately along the path we have chosen.

Areas of Tension

We all recognize that areas of tension exist between educational institutions and their constituents. Some of these sensitive points are academic freedom, admission policies, religion, curriculum, and inter-collegiate athletics.

Academic freedom--a concept that is quite clear in the minds of most educators--is an ill-defined, hazy concept to many laymen.

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[3] Homer D. Babbidge and Robert M. Rosenzweig, The Federal Interest in Higher Education. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.

Further, all too many of our constituents consider academic freedom something that attaches itself only to the faculty and not to the students.

Not all of our problems with academic freedom, however, are external. Some of our own people are guilty of demanding academic freedom unrestrained by academic responsibility and discipline.

Our constituents seldom distinguish between the professor's role as a public educator as contrasted with his role as a private citizen. Even our friends seem unwilling for us to be involved in the most critical issues of the day. As a matter of fact, laws in many states specifically prohibit faculty members from taking an active role in the political arena. It is discouraging, indeed, that a highly literate group of men and women is denied, either directly or indirectly, the right to participate actively and openly in democratic decision-making.

Political activity is not necessarily the most crucial restriction related to academic freedom. Far more significant are the constraints some would impose on the right of the teacher to teach and the student to learn. These constraints go directly to the heart of the scholar's right to pursue a disciplined search for the truth and to make the truth known. These constraints go directly also to the heart of the student's right to be exposed to widely divergent and conflicting points of view and to his right of freedom of expression and peaceful protest.

When either a faculty member or a student publicly declares himself at odds with the sentiment of the vocal majority within the community, the president's telephone begins to ring. When a faculty member or a student publicly proclaims that we might make progress by changing traditional patterns of behavior, the president's mail box overflows. And when either faculty or students participate--or even suggest the possibility of participating--in a public demonstration designed to call attention to what they believe to be unfair or unjust community practices, the telephone rings, the mail box overflows, the waiting room is jammed--even the president's wife is subject to anonymous telephone calls. When the student newspaper prints some of the more extreme thoughts of some of the students, even our legislative constituents take time from their important law-making activities to question us about the radicals on our campus. On those rare occasions when a highly controversial public figure is slated to speak on the college campus, we are hit broadside by our constituents. Those who agree with the speaker are delighted and congratulate us on our foresight in bringing him to the campus. Those who disagree are horrified and accuse us of deliberately exposing young minds to evil. And I might add that the expressions of interest, both *pro* and con, come from our students and faculty as well as our external constituents.

Admission policies come in for their share of interest from our constituents. The questions most often asked are: Why can't Jimmy get in when Tommy can; and why do you take those out-of-state students when you won't take some of our own?

In this day of mass education, the principle of selective admissions is not easy to explain. Yet, if we are to maintain reasonable standards of academic achievement, every public institution simply cannot admit all who apply. This problem is perhaps more critical in a state university than in any other public educational institution. Many of our constituents believe that because we are supported by tax money, we have an obligation to admit every child who holds a high school diploma. You in California have done much to solve this problem by providing a variety of institutions designed to meet a variety of education needs, each with its appropriate admissions policies. Hopefully, the other states will emulate your pattern--as Florida is doing.

But admission based upon academic ability is not our only problem. The question of admitting members of minority groups is a concern of many constituents. Court orders have solved part of this problem for us. After admission has been secured by legal or voluntary action, there is the problem of actual acceptance or rejection of the students within the community. Can members of minority groups patronize business establishments such as restaurants and barbershops surrounding the campus? Do members of minority groups feel free to participate in the wide gamut of social activities found on the campus? Can we justify devoting more time and attention to members of minority groups than to our other students? These are but a few of the questions which we face initially when members of minority groups are admitted to our institutions, and, rest assured, we hear directly from both our legal and our extra-legal constituents on these issues.

Still another source of tension between us and our constituents is the admission of out-of-state students. Some ask why the taxpayers of one state should provide education for students from another state? They ask why "native" students should be denied admission at the same time that "foreign" students are accepted? Others ask how we can offer more than just a provincial educational opportunity if we refuse to admit those from other places, other states, other countries. Most of the first-rate public institutions serve primarily residents of their own states but admit a reasonable number of non-resident students.

Like admissions, religion on the campus is another perennial source of tension between educational institutions and their constituents. As public institutions we must observe the constitutional separation of church and state. But this distinction is not always clear. Is it proper for us to spend public funds to employ a chaplain? Should we use our auditoria for religious meetings? Should we support religious services from public funds? Is it proper for us to ask students to declare their religious affiliations when applying for admission or after they arrive on campus? Is a baccalaureate service a violation of the doctrine of separation of church and state? These are some of the questions relative to the place of religion on the campus. For each question there are conflicting responses from our constituents, and these responses vary from region to region. Frequently the vocal response to these questions comes from those who would eliminate all vestige of religion from the campus.

Another sensitive area that creates tension between the academic community and its constituents is in the field of curriculum--courses offered, library materials used, academic standards, and degree requirements.

As a larger and larger percentage of our young people go to college, we experience pressures for an expanded curriculum. There are pressures on us to train young men and women for positions all the way from secretaries to surgeons, from meat graders to nuclear physicists. These demands pose extremely crucial problems. As publicly supported institutions we have an obligation to meet the legitimate needs of our state and its citizens. However, a college or university cannot permit itself to become an educational supermarket with something for everybody. Despite the pressures, each institution must determine what curricula it can most appropriately and most effectively offer.

We are subject to continuing criticism of library materials and textbooks. It must be made clear that it is the faculty's responsibility to select the materials for the courses being taught and the research being undertaken. To permit others to control library holdings would destroy the very heart of an educational institution.

Academic standards and degree requirements do not often become a source of tension. But when the son or daughter of a prominent constituent cannot meet the specified requirements, we are sometimes asked to justify our standards. Nonetheless, most of the tension created by degree requirements comes from within--from our faculty and our students. The conflicts between academic disciplines as to what should and what should not be required produce heated discussions on a college campus. Fortunately, college presidents seldom if ever have to make the final decision in these matters which are properly decided by the faculties.

Less directly related to academic endeavors but often a source of real tension between a public institution and its constituents is inter-collegiate athletics. Frankly, I believe that there is substantially as much pressure from internal constituents as there is from external constituents on this subject.

Should we engage in inter-collegiate athletics? Should we emphasize or de-emphasize our program? Are we building character or ego in our athletic program? Should we enlarge the stadium or build a new wing on our library? There are just about as many answers to these questions as there are constituents who interest themselves in the problems. In my judgment, the best that we can hope to do is to have a faculty committee to develop policies and then hold the athletic personnel responsible for operating within the policies. Every effort should be made to insure that inter-collegiate athletics provide an educational experience for those who participate.

These, then, are some of the sources of tension--some of the areas that cause conflict between educators and those with legal power or those with influence.

Conclusion

As presidents of educational institutions, ours is the difficult but challenging task of developing the strategy that will encourage appropriate supervision and discourage unwarranted interference in the activities and programs for which we are responsible.

Politicians are expected to keep their fences mended if they hope to stay in public offices; so educational administrators need to keep their fences mended if they hope to be in a position to administer their institutions effectively and to chart a true course among conflicting points of view relative to the operation of a college or university in all its ramifications.

Effective communication with his constituents is perhaps the best single way for an administrator to keep his fences mended. Let your constituents know what you are doing. But more important, let them know why. Many a problem, many a conflict can be prevented if the parties know the facts in the case at the outset. I would like to stress that it is not enough to let our constituents know about decisions after they are made. Advance information should be given to the right people at the right time; don't wait for them to read sensitive news in the press or hear about it through the grapevine.

This doesn't mean that a president must always seek out his constituents prior to making decisions, but it does mean that once the decision is made those who will be most vitally affected by it or who will be most concerned should be given the courtesy of learning about it at the earliest feasible time.

Communication, to be effective, must travel two ways. Our constituents should have confidence that we are both willing and anxious to have the benefit of their suggestions. Although we may not always, or even often, agree with them, our door should be open to them.

Weak or vacillating performance by the administrators is an invitation to those who would interfere. As presidents, we must insist upon the right to answer internal questions internally; to make the decisions that properly are ours to make; to stand as the touchstone between our institutions and our external constituents. In essence, we must be willing to administer that which is properly ours to administer.

In conclusion, we must recognize that, desirable as it might sometimes seem, no public institution can exercise complete autonomy or independence. We are part of the environment in which we exist. We can remain passive; we can attempt to be totally responsive to the shifting winds of desires as expressed by our various constituents; or we can vigorously lead in the direction our best judgment points, recognizing fully that we will be subjected to the power and authority of the state and the extra-legal power of our constituents. If we adopt the third tactical alternative, we will find, as we should, that we are neither in complete harmony nor total discord with our environment. If we are successful and survive, we will find it possible to apply our leadership to shaping the environment of our institution more closely to our concepts of the good environment--to find that delicate balance between proper responsiveness to our constituents on the one hand and proper adherence to our basic beliefs and traditions on the other.

THE STUDY OF COMMUNITY POWER

Martha Derthick

Stanford University

How to study community power is a topic that has perhaps stirred more debate among American social scientists than any other in recent years. The debate has centered around Floyd Hunter's book, Community Power Structure, a study of Atlanta which appeared in 1953. Mr. Hunter, a sociologist, followed what has come to be called the "reputational method" of studying community power. The method entails asking presumably well-informed sources who in the community has power. Mr. Hunter subsequently came under attack from scholars who argued that the way to find out who has power is not to ask informants but to observe decision-making processes. Only in this way, it was argued, could one distinguish who actually has power from those who are merely thought to have it. The method of observing and analyzing decision-making in public matters to find out who actually initiates, modifies, or blocks proposals has been used, for example, by Robert Dahl, a political scientist, in studying New Haven, and by Edward Banfield, also a political scientist, in studying Chicago.

The debate over methodology has been the more intense because these two methods appear to yield quite different results. Hunter, using the reputational method in Atlanta, found a "power elite." He reported that about forty "power leaders," most of them businessmen, "set the line on policy" in city affairs while an "understructure" of several hundred persons, including the principal elected and appointed city officials, merely carry out the policies decided upon by the very few who are at the top of the power structure. Hunter found, upon interviewing the reputed power holders about their activities and associations, that the few at the top are linked together socially, culturally, and economically. They use the machinery of government for the attainment of goals "coordinate with" their interests. By contrast, Dahl in New Haven found what he called a pluralistic system. There is no single group of power-holders, bound by mutual associations. Different people function as leaders in different areas of decision-making, and in all cases the relationship of leaders to those led is ambiguous: it was impossible to distinguish clearly who is leading and who is being led. Dahl found it necessary to distinguish among spheres of influence, between direct and indirect influence, and between actual and potential influence. In Chicago, Banfield found that the professional politicians at the head of the Democratic party machine--an elite of a kind, but certainly not a social or economic elite--have power to decide almost any matter, but they use their power sparingly. They do not themselves initiate proposals for action. Instead, they wait for others to put proposals before them. If all the affected interests agree on the proposals, the politicians then "ratify" the proposals. If the interests disagree among themselves, the politicians delay a decision as long as possible, while at the same time encouraging those concerned to put pressure on them. From the amount and kind of the pressure, the politicians derive cues about how the matter is viewed by the public at large, or at least as much of the public as cares about the matter. They then decide the matter on the basis of their estimate of what the public wants. In effect, they make the decision that will gain them the most, or lose them the least, in popularity.

The differences in the findings of these three studies are doubtless to be accounted for in large part by differences in the cities studied: Atlanta is very different from New Haven, and Chicago is different from either. Perhaps if Dahl or Banfield had studied Atlanta, they too would have found a power elite, as Hunter did. But it seems likely that the differences in method also influenced the findings. Perhaps, too, differences in professional perspectives played a part. It must be more than coincidental that sociologists who study community power usually find the structure to be elitist, whereas political scientists usually find such structures to be pluralistic. The sociologists tend to stress the power of economic elites. Economic power, in their view, coincides with political power. Thus, it was a sociologist who wrote not long ago, "Social scientists generally agree that businessmen not only control the American community but know they do." The political scientist would dissent. In his view, although businessmen play a prominent part in making important decisions in most communities, they share power with many others--with politicians; with many interest groups, such as the PTA or League of Women Voters, which do not have economic concerns; with bureaucrats; with newspapers, which, although businesses themselves, are not invariably allied with other businesses for political purposes; and with the voters. No political scientist would claim, of course, that power is equally distributed, so as to fulfill the classic ideal that each citizen's opinion will count for as much in the making of public decisions as every other citizen's opinion. Some people are bound to have more power than others, and in this limited sense there is an "elite" consisting of those who "have more." But those who "have more" are, in the view of most political scientists, a heterogeneous group, not narrowly limited to the upper economic level of society. In questioning the sociologist's stress on elitism the political scientist does not deny, either, that there may be places which justify the stress. Some cities are run by small, homogeneous, unrepresentative elites. This is the case in Dallas, for instance. To some extent, the differences between sociologists and political scientists are ones of emphasis or the result of chance choices of cities to study; insofar as this is the case, they may be resolved as more evidence is gathered.

This morning, I would like to bypass the dispute over methodology to examine the more fundamental question of why it is worthwhile to study community power at all. I want to ask, not how to study community power, but whether to study it. The question is entirely academic, for the study of community power is now thriving. Besides the books I have mentioned, there are dozens of articles on the subject, several new books, and studies in preparation. There is some irony in this, for the study of community power seems to be receiving maximum attention at a time when, as I will argue, it is less relevant to an understanding of American society than ever before.

Three reasons are usually advanced for studying community power:

(1) One is to learn about power itself. The concept of power has for years been of central importance to the study of politics, but even so there remains a great deal of controversy over what it means and whether it is really a useful concept for the study of political phenomena. How do we prove that someone has power? How does a political actor accumulate power? What are the possibilities for and limits on the use of it? What are the advantages and disadvantages of power for the power-holder? (That power has disadvantages tends too often to be overlooked.) Can we find ways of measuring power and comparing amounts of it held by different people? The community can be viewed as a laboratory in which power may be studied, but in this it is no different from other social institutions or organizations--such as the family, the business corporation, a state legislature, or a university--in which we can also see power at work.

(2) A second reason is to learn about the distribution of power in American society. The community has come increasingly to be viewed by social scientists as a microcosm of the whole, a little American society from which we may draw conclusions about the larger. In particular, social scientists have turned to the study of community power to find the answer to the age-old question of politics, who rules? Note the title of Dahl's book about New Haven: Who Governs? Or the title of a recent book that reports the findings of power studies in four communities: The Rulers and the Ruled. Such studies imply or explicitly claim that, from learning who rules in communities, we can project or extrapolate conclusions about who rules in American society generally. If pluralism, the widespread distribution of power, is the norm in American communities, then we have grounds for supposing that it is a national norm as well; if on the other hand, elite rule is characteristic at the level of the

local community, then it may well prevail nationally. The assumption on which such reasoning rests is that democracy--of which a widespread distribution of power is a defining feature--depends on the habits, culture, attitudes, and personality attributes of a people. If Americans have the requisite characteristics, then democracy will flourish wherever governments are established among us. If it can be shown that we do not have the qualities requisite to achieve democracy at the local level, the presumption follows that we lack the qualities to achieve it at any other level.

(3) A third reason for studying community power is to learn about the distribution of power in particular decision-making units--towns and cities--which are thought to be of importance in and of themselves. In other words, the American community is presumed to be the locus of important decisions. It is desirable to know who makes those decisions. Therefore, it is desirable to study the distribution of power in American communities whether or not doing so tells us anything about American society as a whole.

The first of the reasons I have suggested for studying community power--to learn about power itself--is without doubt valid, but it is the reason least relied on by scholars. The other two reasons, which are more frequently relied on, are more open to challenge.

The community as microcosm. Communities could be regarded as microcosms of the larger society only if they reproduced the principal political features of the larger society. They do not. As political systems, communities differ from the nation in several crucially important ways.

First, the political functions that they perform are different. Government may be thought of as serving two functions. One is the provision of services which cannot be, or at any rate are not, provided by private organizations. The other function is the management of social conflict. This includes, at a minimum, the maintenance of order; government protects lives and property from criminal depredation. But in all modern societies government does much more. It mediates among and settles conflicting claims of many groups for a share of society's goods, either material goods or other things of value. National and local governments both perform both functions, but local governments have traditionally been concerned primarily with the provision of services. They provide streets and street lighting, water and sewerage services, schools, parks, and playgrounds, hospitals, zoos and libraries; they license and inspect public eating places and markets; they control traffic; they regulate private construction through building and zoning codes. This is not an exhaustive list, but is is enough to provide a contrast with the national government. Except for the post office, the national government is not conspicuously engaged in the provision of services. By comparison with community governments, it has been heavily involved in the management of conflict. It has, for example, regulated relations between labor and management through the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act. It has regulated conflict among industries, for example, by allocating TV and radio broadcast channels and air passenger routes. It has regulated conflicts between producers and consumers, for example, through anti-trust and fair trade laws. It has mediated between the rich and the poor with measures for the redistribution of wealth.

Second, besides having different functions than the national government, local governments have different institutional forms. The forms are not as different as they might be, for the principle of the separation of powers which was incorporated in the national government has been widely copied on the lower levels of our federal system. The states reproduce the federal model with reasonable fidelity; the cities, with less, for they do not have bicameral legislatures and many have abandoned the separation of powers in favor of a form (the council-manager form) in which all policy-making functions are vested in an elected council, the mayor being reduced to a mere ceremonial figure. It is in the differing roles of executive, legislature, and courts (and not in the structure of these branches) that the contrasts between the national government and local governments appear most striking. A mayor, unlike the President, is not a popular leader and proposer of programs for action. He is above all an administrator. An executive, as Richard Neustadt has pointed out in his book on the presidency, must be either a leader or a clerk. Most presidents strive, with considerable success, to be leaders; most mayors manage only to be clerks, even if clerks with very large responsibilities. Presidents are deferred to, looked to for leadership in solving conflicts and proposing broad programs, command enormous assets of prestige, and have unlimited access to the public media of press and TV. Most mayors have few comparable assets of power, even on a local scale. The contrast is even more striking in the case of the legislature. City councils or boards of aldermen are weak by comparison with Congress. The amount of criticism recently directed at Congress is in a way a tribute to its importance. Congress is charged by its many critics with being "obstructionist"--but the critics at least pay it the favor of acknowledging its power to obstruct. Its defenders say that its slowness is the price we pay for achieving a national consensus through the legislative process. But most city councils, at least in the big, industrial cities of the North and East, are mere rubber stamps for the city administration, inconspicuous, often incompetent, with little power to obstruct and little capacity to debate issues with the aim of arriving at a consensus on important public matters. Newspapers pay attention to them only to criticize or poke fun.

Whereas Congress is overburdened with work, the council in many American cities is much worse off: It has no work at all. As for judicial functions, local courts are pale imitations indeed of the Supreme Court. They deal mainly with petty offenders; they have no power to review laws.

Besides having different functions and different institutional forms of government, local communities differ from the nation with respect to socio-economic composition. The nation is extremely heterogeneous. It is urban, suburban, and rural. It contains manufacturing, mining, farming, finance, and service industries. It contains the rich, the middle class, the poor. It contains a variety of ethnic groups and religions. Communities, by comparison, are homogeneous. Whereas the national norm is variety, a community is likely to have a predominant, distinctive class or ethnic character or economic activity. Even relatively diverse cities are nowhere near as diverse as the nation. The big central cities have increasingly come to be the dwelling places of the poor and unskilled, though they contain enclaves of the very rich and the middle class. Suburbs tend to be even more homogeneous and distinctive: Most are readily identifiable as residential or industrial, and, if residential, as upper class, middle class, or working class. In any case, they are likely to be inhospitable to Negroes.

Finally, communities could be viewed as microcosms of the larger whole only if size of place were irrelevant to the functioning of a political system. If people were like molecules, we might take a sample of people (as in a local community) and examine the political properties of the sample in order to discover the political properties of a much larger community of similar people (as the chemist may analyze the properties of hydrochloric acid with but a beaker of it). But the size or scale of a political system may affect the functioning of it. Politics, in short, is not the same in big places as in little places. Therefore, there is no reason to expect community politics or community power structures to reveal the properties of national politics or the national power structure.

Given these many differences between communities and the national society, it would be surprising if the distribution of power in the two followed the same or even closely similar patterns. Exactly what the differences imply for the distribution of power at the two levels is hard to say. It may be, for example, that the preoccupation of community governments with service functions rather than settling social conflicts discourages public interest in local affairs, which seem relatively unimportant to the citizen because relatively noncontroversial. If so, this would tend to make popular participation in local affairs less than in national affairs. As another example, the weakness of the legislature at the local level may be a symptom of a lack of vigorous, widespread participation in community government. The legislature at the national level is a channel through which many and various interest groups bring influence to bear on government policy. Congress is beset by such groups. The idle, impotent quality of many big-city councils leads one to suppose that popular demands which on the national level are directed to the legislature are, on the local level, either directed elsewhere or not expressed at all. Again, this may be an indication that popular participation is less, and hence the distribution of power narrower, on the local than on the national level. Whatever the meaning of the differences between communities and the nation which I have cited, it is safe to assume that they imply differences in the respective distributions of power. If power is concentrated in an elite in the "typical" American community, or in a majority of communities, this does not give grounds for supposing that an elite rules nationally, nor would the prevalence of pluralism on the local level prove that pluralism prevails nationally.

Community as decision-making unit. The case for studying community power often rests on the following grounds: More Americans are living in urban communities than ever before, and the problems of urban communities are of greater gravity than ever before. Therefore, it is imperative to study the power structure of urban communities to learn who is making decisions in them--decisions which affect importantly the lives of a large majority of Americans. The case for studying community power, when put on these grounds, depends on the validity of treating the community as a discrete, isolable decision-making structure. It assumes that the decisions about how to deal with community problems are made in the communities that have the problems. This assumption, while not wholly untrue, is probably less true today than ever before. The independent community, making public decisions in self-sufficient isolation, is very hard to find in the United States today.

To study community power structure, one must first find a community--a number of people, living more or less in proximity, who share, over time, a common attachment to the place in which they live. In the United States today, though more people are living in urban places than ever before, probably fewer are living in "communities," if we mean by that places which evoke a strongly shared attachment and form a focus of many kinds of cooperative activity among the people who live in them. At least two major factors have contributed to the decline of community. One is the greatly increased mobility of the population. People move from place to place with relative ease, with the result that they fail to form lasting community attachments. The 1960 census showed that slightly over half of the population had moved within the previous five years (that is, had changed houses; the census does not show how many changed communities). The population movement is encouraged by the development of the nationwide corporation with a headquarters and widely scattered branches, whose personnel move from branch to branch. The loyalty of the corporate nomad to the corporation may transcend his loyalty to the local community. The second factor is the development of the metropolis. We have changed from a nation of farmers to a nation of city-dwellers to a nation of dwellers in the metropolis. The census has defined 212 metropolitan areas consisting of a central city and surrounding satellite towns and cities. In 1960 they contained about two-thirds of the population. It is characteristic of metropolitan areas that the inhabitants' loyalties are divided. The individual may live in one place, work in another, shop in another, go to the movies in yet another, and have friends and relatives in many or none. Again, a high degree of mobility makes this possible. The result is that, in belonging to several communities, the modern dweller in the metropolis is committed wholly to none. Particularly striking in many places is the separation of economic and social elites from the big central cities. The proprietors and managers who supposedly constitute the power elite do not live where their business interests are located. They live in the suburbs. Less well known, but perhaps as prevalent, is the separation of city employees from their place of employment. In the big cities, not only do businessmen live elsewhere; so do commissioners, department heads, and lower-ranking employees such as policemen and firemen. (A survey in Cleveland recently showed that nearly 40% of city employees lived in the suburbs in violation of the city charter.) The community as a locus of decision-making is becoming harder to study because the community is becoming harder to identify and define.

It is true that, though people may come and go, criss-crossing boundaries at will, communities in some sense go on. Urban incorporated places with distinct names and governments survive even as the individuals who live or work within their jurisdiction move or loosen their community ties. But it is increasingly the case that governments in such places do not make public decisions independently. Their existence in a metropolitan area forces them, whether they like it or not (and most do not), to enter into dependent relationships with neighboring places. Even in the absence of formal cooperative arrangements, which are rare, many of their public decisions are contingent upon decisions made elsewhere, in adjacent units of government. Much more importantly, they share decisions in important matters with higher levels of government--the county, the state, the federal government, all of which are increasingly involved in managing public affairs in metropolitan areas. Federal aid to local and state governments has tripled in the last ten years. Thus, the community "power structure," if such a thing may be said to exist, is not confined to the community. Relationships of influence in community affairs, if they could be diagrammed, would not be a network contained within the geographic limits of the community; the lines would break community limits and connect community decision-makers with county courthouses, state capitols, regional federal offices, and Congress and the bureaucracies in Washington.

There is still another difficulty with treating the community as a discrete, isolable unit, with a wholly indigenous "power structure." This is that in any given community, some of the major political actors, who are also holders of power, may be outsiders. I am not referring in this case to county, state, or federal governments that get involved in community decisions. Nor am I referring to businessmen who control property in one place but live elsewhere, for their role as proprietors or managers makes them in a substantial way part of the community in which their business property is located. I am referring to persons who are involved in community politics without, however, being in any substantial way members of the community. They are in the community without being of it; as political actors, they may take cues from or represent the interests of groups that lie partly or wholly outside of the community. To clarify, it may be helpful to think of community political actors as falling into four categories: voters, pressure group activists, appointed public employees, and elected public officials. The first and last categories--voters and elected public officials--are bound by law to be community residents, but the others are not. Pressure group activists may be more or less transient promoters of interests or causes that transcend the boundaries of the community. The best example is civil rights demonstrators who move from southern city to southern city, but the "outside agitator" is not unknown in fields outside of civil rights. Opposition to urban renewal in some places seems to have come partly from persons who were making it their business to agitate against urban renewal wherever it should occur. I suspect that opposition to fluoridation similarly is a movement that transcends community lines, though the individual battles are fought and decisions made in the setting of particular communities. Professional directors of organizations, a special category of pressure group activists, are likely to move from city to city. For example, the director of the NAACP in any given city is not necessarily from that city, nor does he expect to stay. His reference group is his national organization, not the local community, though he is of course expected to adapt to the demands of his local constituency.

Appointed public employees, like pressure group activists, may be outsiders. Again, I am not necessarily thinking of those who, like businessmen, happen to have taken up residence in places other than the one they work in. Rather, I have in mind those whose principal reference group is their profession rather than the community which employs them. Professionalization of local employees has proceeded steadily in recent decades. City managers, for example, have emerged in the last 50 years as a distinct profession, with a journal, a code of ethics, and an allegedly esoteric body of specialized knowledge. With the encouragement and financial assistance of the federal government, a profession of city planners and experts in housing and urban renewal is rapidly developing and becoming influential in middle- and large-sized communities. It is characteristic of the professional that he moves from community to community as opportunities for professional advancement become available. His criteria for success are fixed by the profession, a group dispersed nationwide; it is from his fellow professionals, who speak through journals and professional gatherings, that he takes cues for his conduct in public affairs.

The increased role of outsiders--be they professional city managers or the professional directors of pressure groups--in the politics of the American community does not necessarily make it impossible to speak of a community power structure. The role of the city manager in any given place is analyzable in constant terms, as an element of the "power structure" even though the individual incumbent may take many cues about the conduct of his job from his professional community. Nevertheless, the idea of the local community as an autonomous decision-making unit, which is implicit in the term community power structure, is less realistic today than in the past, before the outsider became so prominent in community politics.

To summarize, I am not arguing against the study of community power, but merely stating a caution or two. First, one should not draw unwarranted inferences from findings about community power, and second, in viewing the community as a locus of power, one should not ignore power relationships that cut across community boundaries. Today, such relationships may be as important in explaining what happens in American communities as the power relationships within the communities.

Whatever the limitations on the study of community power, it holds potential rewards for the policy-maker and the casual student of American government as well as the scholar.

The question of who rules in the American community, which is of enduring academic interest to the scholar, is from a practical standpoint highly relevant today, as we approach a presidential campaign in which the structure of the federal system seems likely to be a prominent issue. The problems of American society, according to Barry Goldwater, should be dealt with by local and state governments, on the theory that the smaller the unit of government, the more democratic it is. Mr. Goldwater's premise appeals to common sense. It has long been supposed that small places were more democratic than large ones: when we think of democracy in its pure form, we think of the New England town. A small place should offer the citizen more opportunities for political participation because he is close to the locus of decision; it should make easily available to him information about politics which will facilitate his participation; and it should enhance his motivation to participate because he will be able to see clearly the impact of public actions upon his own life. Thus we would expect to find a vigorous democratic politic in the small town, with much dicussion and widespread participation. Plausible as this seems, small size may have certain counteracting tendencies. Precisely because the small community enhances proximity--everyone knows everyone else--it becomes extremely difficult to discuss and settle controversial matters, which is one of the prime functions of politics. There seems to be a strong tendency in small places to postpone or avoid controversial decisions or leave them to some other level of government to settle, because the costs of trying to deal with them locally in a democratic fashion are so heavy. Take, for example, the recent efforts of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, to cope with the problems of desegregation. Chapel Hill, a town of about 27,000, is the site of the University of North Carolina and one of the most progressive of southern towns. Last January, approximately 1,800 townspeople petitioned the board of aldermen to enact a public accommodations ordinance. A very difficult problem would have been dealt with locally, making federal action superfluous. But the aldermen avoided voting on the question, and the Chapel Hill Weekly argued in an editorial that the alderman level "is not the place to originate law which bears so directly on fundamental freedoms and constitutional rights." It recommended that the aldermen "direct those seeking redress of racial injustice to a somewhat higher level." Small size may paralyze democratic politics. Community power studies should enable us to answer the question of whether the local community is indeed distinguished by a high degree of democracy, and whether the community has the capacity to cope with social problems. Is the Goldwater premise realistic?

A second, related question that community power studies might usefully explore is the impact of federal involvement in local affairs on community power structures. It would be desirable to study areas of community policy-making, such as highway construction, urban renewal, and poor relief, in which the federal government is deeply involved, to see how decision-making structures in these areas differ from those which are altogether locally controlled. Does federal involvement in local affairs draw more individuals and groups into politics or drive them out? Is community politics more or less pluralistic on account of federal involvement? These are questions to which community power studies have not yet been addressed--but hopefully will be before long.

POWER AND AUTHORITY - EMERGING TRENDS AND ASPIRATIONS*

Burton R. Clark

Center for the Study of Higher Education
University of California

I want to talk about several types of authority in colleges; first, to specify these types and trace their historical development; then, to talk about conflict between administration and faculty, and account for why faculty authority seems to be growing stronger in so many places. Unfortunately, for my discussion, higher education in the United States is many things. It's a complicated enterprise, made up of so many different kinds of colleges that are headed in different directions. It is risky to talk about a main trend in authority, because there are so many different trends among state colleges, universities, junior colleges, and private colleges in the land. But I would like to take the chance of stating a trend in authority, even if later I have to back up somewhat, and then speculate a little bit about the situation in the junior college.

There are many beliefs about who should exercise power in colleges, and how power should be exercised, and I will speak of just three. One we can call the idea or the principle of a public trust; the second, the principle of bureaucracy or of administration; and the third, the principle of collegiality, or colleagueship. First, on public trust. The idea, the concept, the principle of authority that is most widely accepted by Americans for the administering of schools and colleges is the one of public control vested in a board of laymen. The lay board is empowered legally to direct the organization and is held responsible for its welfare. This principle relates to a wide belief in the population that schools and colleges should be directed ultimately by the community, the multiplicity of interests in the community, rather than by the professional personnel within education, or by governmental departments, such as a Ministry of Education in France. In tax-supported colleges, the board members are considered representatives of the whole community or the population of the state. In private colleges, the members of the board are often considered representatives of a sponsoring constituency, e.g., the Lutheran Church, the Quaker community. In either case, public or private, the board member's position is a public trust. The board of trustees is seen as an instrument of external control, control by the community, and of control by persons who are part-time and amateur, rather than full-time and expert. The lay board then is the instrumentality of expressing this principle.

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The legal provision that authority rests with a lay board does not, as we all know, insure that policy is going to be determined primarily by laymen. Colleges, like other organizations, are organized in an hierarchy of personnel staffed with full-time, paid officials. The authority to make many decisions is either delegated to senior officers by the board or is assumed by the officers gradually in the normal course of affairs. The board members, who we must remember are part-time and amateur, are removed from actual operations, while the officials--full-time, expert, informed--make the daily decisions. Even though the board is supposed to make the decisions and policy, and the hired staff to execute it, much determination of policy falls into the hands of the administrators, the trained officials. So then the organization assumes, in some degree, the form of a bureaucracy, as that term is used in the literature of public administration and social science. There is a definite hierarchy of positions with fixed jurisdictions and duties.

Because of the strength of the lay board idea in this country, authority in the hands of expert officials has not been so fully accepted for education as in such realms as business. But as educational systems grow larger and more complex, as educational administration becomes more dependent on expert knowledge and hence on people trained in special fields, then administrative authority increases in strength and contends more strongly with trustee authority. The larger of the academic systems, be they schools or colleges, simply cannot be run without layers of administrators, elaborate staff organization, and expertise.

While disagreeing over whether laymen or administrators should direct policy, these two principles are in agreement that authority is heavily hierarchial in arrangement. The higher authorities, the board of trustees or the college president, are expected to command the work of lower administrators, to direct the teaching force, and to control the student body. There is wide public acceptance of the idea of control through hierarchy, for the idea is strongly rooted in our practical experience, and, of course, many board members take their ideas of how to administer from the structure of business firms, either the actual structure or the structure that they imagine business firms have. This borrowed conception stresses clear lines of authority, stresses clearly demarcated jurisdictions for which officials are held responsible. The business model supports control by administrative officials.

These principles and forms of exercising authority do not have the field to themselves, and it is no secret that many professors feel that authority ought to reside in the faculty. The professors have the idea of a self-governing community within which teachers have much influence on policy, and this idea is an old one in the history of education. The earliest universities in Europe were composed of teacher guilds and student guilds, and some of the universities even grew out of detached bands of teachers and students, who, if unhappy with the way they were treated by the landlords in one town, would pick up and move on to another place. This was before they were encumbered with problems of physical plant. These groups of scholars and students continued to govern themselves down through the ages, even after they became encumbered with physical plants and remained in one place. The tradition of faculty control has remained strong in Europe.

This principle of authority, one of collegial control, had little strength in the origins and the early years of American higher education. The early American colleges were established by religious denominations, and were closely watched by the denominations; the administrators and the teachers were hired to further the orthodoxy as defined by the board of control. So the early colleges in this country were cases of control by outside interest groups, with the control expressed through close supervision by board members selected from the controlling group. In the early colleges, the president had some authority and the faculty little or none. The faculties were small and weak. From this beginning, the long-run trend in academic authority in the United States has been for authority to move from external sources to internal sources. The early colleges gradually moved away from close control by the external bodies, to be directed primarily by their own self-appointing trustees and then increasingly by the appointed president.

With many zigs and zags, the liberal arts college in this country, in the 18th century and the early part of the 19th century, became more autonomous. Then, largely in the last 75 years, that is after 1875, the locus of authority has moved still further inside the college.

The reasons for the historical trend of authority moving from external sources towards internal sources are varied. Secularization was an important reason throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, somewhat breaking the hold of the church fathers over the officials. Then, after 1875, the university became a primary influence. When the university came into this country there came a broadening of function. To the old task of conserving knowledge and transmitting it to the next generation, there was added a newer task of creating knowledge, with its research and scholarly work. This new task was much more controversial in nature, much more subversive of society than teaching was, and this required more elbow room for academic man. Research requires considerable freedom. Scholarly work in general, you might say, is a kind of academic work that really only peers of a man in the same field can evaluate at all well, in contrast to the teaching of traditional knowledge. Then, when the university came into this country, there also came the old European ideal of a community of scholars. Both the functional nature of the university and some of the ideas of a university worked toward greater autonomy for those who were within colleges and universities.

The most important element of all in the transfer of authority from external groups to internal groups is the increasing size and complexity of organization. All our colleges grow ever larger, it seems. Large scale removes the outsider from knowledge about, observation of, and involvement in, daily operations. The controlling board is increasingly pushed up into the clouds; it is forced to fly at 30,000 feet instead of hedge-hopping over the terrain, and down there on the ground there are many professors and instructors doing things that the board never sees. The board is bound to miss much of the landscape. When we compare the old small college with our larger systems of today, we realize the vast change in the opportunity of the board to supervise everything that is going on. The authority vested in trustees must be delegated more and more down the line, to the additional layers of administrators that are interposed between the board and the actual operations.

With the increasing size and complexity, also comes increasing expertise in administration and in the work of the faculty. Knowledge expands, techniques of administration and instruction proliferate, and men who are expert at specific lines of work become more expert and more necessary. To the staff we bring the specialized counselor, the expert in student affairs, the expert in finance and accounting, specialists in alumni affairs, public relations, lobbying, and so on. With this expertness comes a certain amount of technical basis for exercising authority; the men who have the special knowledge and skills, are bound to have some authority accrue to them. In many areas of administration it takes one expert to tell another expert that he is wrong.

It seems to me that no reversal of these historical tendencies is in sight, and we ought to expect this trend from external to internal to continue. We have to expect that the authority of external lay groups will become more and more exercised at a very general level, and that more authority will be exercised by those who are full-time and on the job. This means that the problem of authority in colleges and universities is increasingly taking the form of a conflict between administrators and the faculty, between bureaucrats and colleagues, between the salaried expert administrator and the faculty member. This conflict has natural, not manufactured, sources; each side has cogent causes. As the faculties march off into battle, in this conflict, they wave the banners of self-government and academic freedom, they emphasize equality of relations among colleagues, they deemphasize administrative hierarchy. The administrators move forward under a cluster of banners: let's try to bring some order into this chaotic system; let's increase efficiency, use our scarce resources of money and personnel more effectively; let's somehow give this whole organization a sense of direction, with some knowledgeable hands on the helm; let's be sure that when we face outside forces that we face them as a unified body. The administrators have a number of cogent doctrines and arguments with which to contend with the faculty.

The future promises that the hand of each party will be strengthened. The administration must grow in size and influence. Everything we know about managerial technique, technology, and bureaurocracy points in this direction. At the same time the faculties also grow in size, they grow in complexity, and they grow in special knowledge. They, too, extend their influence, taken as a whole or even in subunits, and this is a trend with no reversal in sight. Academic specialism is bound to increase and the faculties, in many respects, are bound to grow more autonomous. The ethos of academic freedom is spreading further and further within the ranks of academic man. Teachers colleges, for example, used to be fairly autocratic places. But these places are transforming their authority structures, especially as they become comprehensive state colleges, and they are less autocratic than in the past.

In short, there is now in the organizations of higher education an inherent strain toward greater conflict between the administration and the faculty. In many respects, this conflict is similar to a conflict that is growing in other organizations where it is usually called the conflict between the organization and the profession, for the expert who is located within an organization is subject to the pull of two different frames of reference. He is subject to the authority, the influence, the appeal to loyalty, of both his organization and his professional group. Professional men everywhere strain toward some self-regulation, but at the same time continue to be subject to the administrative structure they are in.

The lodging of authority in the hands of administrators and the faculty certainly does not mean that the trustees are out of business. Trustees will go on having considerable say in school and college matters. But they will have to operate ever more at a greater remove from actual practice, and to be content with policy at broader and broader levels of statement and supervision. I do not mean to deny that trustee authority is strong, and will continue to be strong, but it seems to me that the trend is toward the strengthening of the hand of the full-time administrator and also the hand of the faculty.

At this point, I would like to turn from this sketch of trends in authority to the current situation. I want to talk about some of the advantages and disadvantages of extensive faculty authority. Let us see if we can strike a balance between the advantages and disadvantages of increasing amount of faculty influence.

First on the disadvantages. It has been widely noted that faculties are conservative bodies, when it comes to making changes where the shoe fits, or where the shoe rubs a little bit, that is, in their own areas. It's a very common view to speak of faculties as established interests. They are often vested interests of a college, in their disciplines, in the departments, in their divisions of colleges, and so on. Faculties are often not adaptive to new points of view that would cut across the existing arrangement of the program, or that would add to it. Strong authority in the faculty, then, can mean resistance to innovation, resistance to change. One administrator put it this way: "Innovations that seem to conflict with established interests require that the power to initiate be located outside the area of established interest.... The advantage of having central administration lies not in its superior wisdom but in its detachment." That is, the central administration can be more detached than different groups in the faculty about, say, changes in the curriculum. Another observer, after visiting 18 colleges and universities to look into relationships between administration and faculty, recorded his "strong impression" that "the conservative nature of an institution is ordinarily reinforced as the faculty takes on more power in policy determination and execution."

Strong faculty control also often means much inefficiency and instability, at least in the short run. For example, close faculty control over admissions in a small liberal arts college may mean that a half dozen faculty members give over a good share of their lives for several months, February, March, April of the year, to judging applicants, to doing work that in other colleges where there is less faculty control over admissions, is done by administrative staffs, with the faculty free to teach and do things that they were originally hired to do. Strong faculty control commonly means rule by committee, and we know that rule by committee means a certain slowness and hesitancy, a certain confusion, in decision-making. You often get piecemeal decision-making with strong faculty government. Then, the president's position can sometimes be made almost intolerable when we have strong faculty authority because the president is held accountable by outsiders and the board for the college's overall welfare, for its major policies, for its long-run shape, but he does not have the authority to shape it in a meaningful way. In the extreme, instability takes the form of a quick succession of presidents. In sum, then, there is concern that strong faculty influence leads to resistance to innovation, inefficiency, instability, slowness, and piecemeal policy-making.

Now let us turn the coin over and look at some of the advantages in colleges of strong influence of faculties. The thing that has come to my attention as a long-run consequence of faculty influence is that it seems to help a college attract capable faculty members and retain them. Competent faculty members are the most important resource of an institution and extensive authority in the hands of faculty seems instrumental in recruiting and holding them. There is a positive correlation between academic quality of colleges and the extent of faculty influence. The correlation comes from the fact that in the very best colleges in the land the faculties have much authority; in the very worst colleges, they have virtually no authority; and in the middle ground there is much overlap. This correlation is not accidental. Faculty authority has a part in maintaining a pre-eminent position. This kind of a sequence often takes place. A strong president comes into a college, and raises it to an eminent position, perhaps in a decade or two. He raises the college to eminence by recruiting a first-class faculty. Then, when the Great Man leaves, that first-class faculty takes over. We see this in one institutional evolution after another. The Great Man built the great institution by bringing in a great faculty but after he leaves, after the time of considerable change, that faculty takes over and weaker presidents come along to consolidate the change. Such faculties usually have a strong potential for replacing themselves on a high level of quality. What gets around to people who are looking for jobs is the status of the place, its reputation for strong faculty government, and, with that, freedom from administration and lay control. Faculty men who are looking for positions are often influenced by such aspects of reputation. Will the college be a relatively free place for them, or relatively buttoned-up? Will they be pushed around, supervised closely, and so on? Then, faculty members often remain in the places of high faculty influence because the running of the college has become their business. We ought to think of faculty involvement as an involvement mechanism; faculties that capture control are faculties that get involved in policy and are somewhat captured themselves in turn. They are more committed to the college because they are involved in policy-making. After a half a dozen years or so in such a place, a faculty member may well have invested too much of himself to leave. In short, then, faculty authority attracts men, it involves them, and it commits them, and this can be of enormous advantage in attracting and retaining a good faculty, in the face of a poor salary scale, in the face of an unfavorable geographic location, and the like. We all know of cases of institutions where the word gets around on the outside that it is not a good place to go to, because it is dictatorial.

We find young men coming out of the universities saying they would not touch that institution with a ten-foot pole. I remember being warned about certain institutions when I was coming out of graduate study at U.C.L.A. At that time there were one or two state colleges in California that had a reputation of being rather autocratic. I remember being warned by my professors to stay away from these places; they were not places where the faculty was happy, not a happy place in the sense of academic freedom. We can also note that there are regions of the country, such as the South, in which the quality of higher education is adversely affected by the academic man's perception of where he will be free. There is some data on this. Surveys have been done of men coming out of universities, and unfortunately for the South, a very large number of men in the total recruitment pool will not consider going beneath the Mason-Dixon line. It is a social fact that many of the best academic men are attached to the ideas of a community of scholars and academic freedom. The places that fit these beliefs are places they want to go to, and places that do not fit these beliefs are places they try to avoid.

A second advantage of a strong hand of the faculty in decision-making is that of having multiple judgments brought to bear on critical decisions. It has been widely noted in organizational analysis, that even though committees are slow, there are advantages in committees in that people of different perspectives and sensitivity check over the problem. If many people have been consulted, many perspectives brought to bear, the possible bias of a single man is compensated for, or overcome by, or challenged by the perspectives of other men. C. P. Snow, among others, has noted this problem in talking about the role of science advisors to government. Snow has suggested that in England perhaps a great mistake was made during World War II in allowing one man from the realm of science to have too much influence on British policy on how to carry out the war. There has been much concern in our own government as to how to bring the advice of the scientific community to bear on public policy. One alternative is to have it all funnelled through one science advisor to the President. The great difficulty with this kind of nice, neat arrangement is the possibility of a big mistake. A particular scientist will have some blind spots. More and more we find the influence of such men abridged by a committee system. All governments want the advice of rather elaborate committees of scientists. One of the reasons for this is simply to consult very widely, to bring a number of eyes and ears and brains to bear on policy. I think this is an important feature of faculty government. Wide consultation is built into its machinery of the Senate, the Assembly, the faculty system of committees, and the like. The multiplicity of judgment often gives us better judgment than a single source, even though it is slower in the making.

When we have considerable authority in the hands of faculty members, we also are allowing more leeway for expert judgment. Who knows best what should be taught in mathematics: lay men in the community, the college president, or the math teacher? We want laymen to have some influence, we want the college president to have some influence; but we usually have to say that the judgment of the math teacher should have greatest weight, especially with the changes that are taking place in mathematics curriculum. The authority structure of the college ought to allow for, ought to insure, that we get the judgments of the experts; and we ought to protect the math teacher against arbitrary decisions by people who are truly incompetent, and most of us are incompetent in mathematics. Logan Wilson, President of the American Council of Education, in his classic study of the academic man in 1942, noted that academic work requires a large sphere of individual authority compared to other kinds of work and other kinds of organization. We can juxtapose the academic situation against the requirement of the assembly line in a plant, where you do not dare turn people loose on the job. The nature of the work dictates that we supervise closely and integrate the men in the line. Academic work is at the other extreme from that kind of situation. Faculty power is one way of providing faculty with spheres of individual authority and of turning people loose on the job.

Faculty authority can be related to professional authority. The professional worker usually needs and he always seeks to have the largest degree of autonomy from lay control and from normal organizational control. Who is the best judge of surgical procedures in the hospital: the layman on the outside, the hospital administrators, or the surgeons? Most of us going under the knife would want the decision made by the surgeons. As work becomes professionalized, more specialized around special skills and special bodies of knowledge, then the way that we organize work inside of agencies must create room for expert judgment, for the judgment of the surgeon, the judgment of the Professor of Chemistry, the judgment of the professionalized social worker. A high degree of autonomy for the individual practitioner is a hallmark of the advanced profession.

Not all professional groups need the same degree of autonomy for individual practitioners. Some professions largely give advice, such as lawyers, and some professions largely follow the guidelines of a body of knowledge that is handed down to them and they just require sufficient leeway to give honest, expert judgment. They have to be able to apply the judgments of their field to the problem. This requires some autonomy but not an enormous amount. The people who require enormous autonomy on the job are those who are trying to create something new or are engaged in such controversial activities as teaching controversial issues to young minds, or whose work requires that they pursue the logic of an intellectual discipline no matter where it leads them. Academic man is a special kind of professional man, a type characterized by rather high need for autonomy in his work performance. If we are going to be innovative in colleges, if we are going to be critical of established ways, if we are going to teach controversial issues, we need considerable autonomy for the individual who is in the scholarly role.

Almost everywhere in modern organizations, we find war going on between professional orientations and administrative orientations. In the hospital, the basic conflict of authority is between the control of the non-medical hospital administrator, who is in charge of the nurses and regular routines of the hospital, and the authority of the doctors. A sharp clash between the authority of administrators and the authority of professionals is noticeable in the new research and development laboratories of industry. We have something on the order of a half a million men now in these laboratories, and many of these technologists have a high degree of expertise. They are interested in research, some applied, some pure, and they press management hard for a large degree of freedom. Their fondest wish is to be left alone. They make the point to management that in scientific work it often is better to do just that, to leave men alone for three years at a time, or five years at a time, that basic discoveries stem not from managerial direction but from the scientist following his own hunches for a long period and pursuing the leads he develops as he goes along. Management has found these men difficult to deal with; morale studies have shown that often the technologists are more unhappy than blue-collar workers or lower white collar workers, people who are making less money than the scientists and engineers are and have fewer benefits. Their morale suffers very easily from traditional forms of management, and management has had to accommodate to them.

The situation in industry helps us understand that professional authority and bureaucratic authority are both necessary within the modern organization. Each form of authority performs a central function. Professional authority protects the exercise of the special expertise of the technologist, allowing his judgment to be pre-eminent in many matters and to be weighed importantly in other matters. The authority of the officials functions to provide the coordination of the work of the technologist with the work of the other major elements of the firm. We could not have just either one or the other, we have to have both. The general administrative direction of the industrial firm is simply not capable of providing certain judgments, certain expert judgments. The professional sector, on the other hand, is not capable of providing the overall coordination, and central management has to provide that. The central problem is how to serve simultaneously the requirements of autonomy for the expert and the requirements of coordination for the whole enterprise. We have all kinds of accommodations being thrashed out these days within industry between managers and these new experts.

In short, the professional man in the organization presents everywhere this special kind of problem. He gains authority compared to most of the other employees because he has special knowledge and special skills, and with that comes authority. He loses authority, compared to the old days when this professional man was on the outside by virtue of the fact that organizations must locate much decision-making in administrative positions. This problem of allocating authority between the professional and the administrators varies in intensity, and varies in form, in different kinds of organization. It happens that scientists and academics seem to have very high requirements for autonomy and press hard against managers and administrators.

I would like to turn in closing to the special case of the junior college. I think that faculty influence within the public junior college is bound to increase. We ought to expect the demands of faculty for influencing decision-making to continue to grow stronger and that more faculty influence will be exercised. Junior colleges, like other colleges, are growing larger and more complex. I go back to one of my original statements about why authority becomes located inside of organizations. As they become larger and more complex, then lay boards and central administrators have to govern at a higher remove from actual practice. There must be more give and take, and more interstices in the organization which will be partly filled by faculty influence. Instructors in junior colleges, whether they are called teachers or professors, are becoming more expert in specialties similar to their counterparts in other kinds of colleges. Knowledge is in an endless proliferation, and men to be competent in knowledge specialize evermore narrowly. Ten or fifteen years ago, we might have gotten by with two or three men in biology, for example, but today we may need five or six or eight; with the rapid development of biology, one or two people cannot cover the store, the range of specialties.

With rapid changeover in knowledge--new math, new physics, new biology, even eventually new sociology--any layman or administrator who strives to catch up on a subject cannot expect to stay with it very long. A college administrator who works hard to become informed about the alternatives in mathematics, faces the likelihood that what he does know becomes obsolete much faster than it used to. Five years from now, or ten years from now, when a new set of books comes out, what he does know has been entirely revamped, and only the experts in the math department have a good chance of keeping up. With the junior college instructor becoming more specialized, a certain amount of decision-making will flow into his hands.

The junior college instructors are also becoming more identified with higher education. The junior college as an organization has been moving recently toward identification with higher education. The instructor in the junior college will be taking more cues from men in the state colleges, the universities, and the private colleges, and fewer from men in the secondary schools and the elementary schools. If the instructors in the junior college become evermore identified with higher education, then of course they are going to be influenced by what is going on in nearby colleges. This means in California that the junior college instructor has his eye somewhat on what is going on in the California state colleges. The state colleges have been evolving very rapidly since the end of World War II. Among the changes have been changes in the distribution of authority, with authority flowing away from the president's office to other loci of influence. Some of the authority is moving toward the new statewide office and board; the campuses are losing some of their authority upward, toward the new statewide bodies that did not exist until the last 2 years. Also, some authority is moving into the faculties as they create senates and assemblies, on the local campus and on a statewide basis. The state college presidency is never going to be the same, it is never going to be the same kind of position it was 10 or 15 years ago. On campus after campus, the faculties are demanding and are getting greater voice in decision-making. This is bound to influence junior college faculties to become part of their reference and orientation.

The University of California and the liberal arts colleges also of course serve as models. They are well-equipped with faculty authority, especially the University with its elaborate system of faculty committees.

The instructors, as they become specialists and attempt to keep up in their specialties, spend more time in the graduate schools. This means longer acquaintance with university norms. The longer young men rub up against university norms, the more they think of their college from the standpoint of university conceptions, including "community of scholars" and "academic freedom." Also, more teachers in the junior colleges are coming directly to the junior college from the training institutions and fewer via the high school. This lessens the high school perspective of junior college instructors. The high school is less concerned about faculty influence on decision-making than the university. The sources of faculty seem in flux and I presume that they are making a difference.

Finally, in talking about authority, we have to ask authority for what? Authority for what purposes; for what ends? Authority structure is a means to an end, and no one form of authority is sacred. The authority structure must serve the ends of the organization, it must be adapted as the ends change or as the conditions under which we work change. Authority structure ought to be judged as rational or not on the basis of whether it helps us to achieve the ends of the college, such ends as the conservation, transmission and creation of knowledge. If the state of knowledge is changing, with knowledge becoming evermore specialized, evermore in need of expert care and feeding, then educational organization is likely to change. The pressures that we feel from faculties to expand their perogatives and power are not capricious nor accidents of history for the most part. The pressures have structural causes, they are related to changes and trends in society. The strain that administrators have to experience with faculties cannot be completely dissolved. The strain can be handled, accommodated, lessened, but it cannot be banished. It is natural and indefinitely with us. It is the kind of strain that we have whenever we place professional men inside a modern complex organization, especially when these professional men have tasks that demand much autonomy if they are to be done well.

Finally, then, the problems of how to distribute authority within colleges are really part of a very old problem of man--the problem of how to have individual freedom on the one hand and collective responsibility on the other. Inside organizations this problem takes the form of autonomy of the individual worker versus the coordination of the whole enterprise. Every organization that exists is a system for coordinating the effort of many people, and we charge administrators with a task of coordination; but the coordination has to be adjusted to, it has to be abridged by, the needs of some workers, the more specialized workers, to make independent or quasi-independent judgment. Colleges become these hybrid systems of authority because the lay authority and the administrative authority are needed for coordination to hold the system together, and to give it some direction, while at the same time faculty authority is needed to allow for and guard the judgment of this vast cluster of experts that we call a faculty. The college has to be a loose ship, administratively, because it is functional for authority to be dispersed, for authority to be overlapping, for authority to be ambiguous. By most of the criteria of efficient management we encounter in textbooks, criteria such as accountability and clear lines of communication, the college is going to be not only a loose ship, it is going to be a downright mess. The way we are going, given modern social trends, the college is going to become looser and it is going to become messier. Rather than try to straighten up the college, rather than trying to keep it neat and clean, we will have to revise our criteria of effective administration. We need to revise our criteria of what is long-run efficiency in colleges, to bring them closer to the actual conditions of effective academic work, to bring them closer to the conditions of creativity, to bring them closer to the conditions of brilliance and stimulating teaching, and to bring them closer to the conditions under which students are sparked to think for themselves and to become self-educating.

POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY OF YOUTH: ASPIRATIONS AND REALITIES

Joseph D. Lohman

School of Criminology
University of California

My topic has been set as the responsibility of youth, aspirations and realities. You will pardon me if I take some liberties and do what I understand is usually done in speeches--take the assigned title and say what I want to say.

Most thoughtful students of the problems of young people are quick to assess their difficulties in the light of changing social and economic conditions. The socio-economic scene complicates and even aggravates the central concern of every self-sustaining individual, namely, the realization of personal work satisfaction, or the finding of one's self in one's life task or work. Paul Goodman has stated the issues succinctly when he writes "It's hard to grow up when there isn't enough man's work." But, sweat and toil alone are not the whole of the problem. As Goodman further indicates "to produce necessary food and shelter is man's work." And in most of economic history most men have done this grudging work, certain that it is justified and worthy of a man to do it, though often feeling that the social conditions under which they did it were not worthy of a man. Thinking sometimes that it is better to die than to live so hard, they have worked on. Security is always first, and in normal conditions a large part of security comes from knowing that your contribution is useful and the rest from knowing that it is uniquely yours--that "they" need you. Earlier generations in the United States have been needed because the very life of the family--bread on the table or coal in the kitchen range--depended on their contributions. Even for the slum child, scavenging along the railroad tracks to get coal, it wasn't difficult, however irksome the task, to understand that this was a meaningful and important function that he was performing. He was wanted. What he was doing was needed and it was significant in this sense. Hence, chores, as we knew them, were something more than these mere irksome invasions of childish freedom; they were meaningful additions to the family income. The family larder, indeed the security of the family itself, often depended on the contribution of its youthful members.

Last summer I was privileged to take a trip through Yugoslavia, with a team from the University of California, to visit and study. There, youth is eagerly petitioned, implored, and nurtured because, to use their phrase, the elder carriers of the revolution see that youth is needed. They know that only youth can take up and carry on the task of shaping and forging their hopes for a new and better society. And, similarly, in the newly emergent nations of Africa and Asia only youth who are free of tradition and the ancient past can move their societies from conditions of horrible confusion and anarchy toward rational economic interdependence and a new unifying democracy. In such places and under such conditions, where the adults and the young people of the society see the need for each other, there is less tension, less estrangement of the generations from each other. Indeed, the generations are much in need of each other, not alone for the economic survival of the society, but even more for the maintenance of its very integrity as a moral order. Without such mutual recognition there cannot be that sense of being needed and that corresponding commitment by the younger generation, which, alone through insuring the self-respect of youth, makes both the young and the old secure and the future of the society more certain.

But in these times, in these United States, we no longer have, for the most part, the same needs for our children. For example, we no longer need them to support us in old age as was the case before the advent of the collective institutionalized social security system. Indeed, for economic reasons and more recently for technological reasons, the adult world finds little need for youth. For the most part, they are in the way; they are a burden. To a large extent youth has been transformed from an economic asset for the average parent into his greatest economic liability. The fact that the child has become an income tax deduction has by no means made up the difference. The prolongation of childhood and the child labor laws, quite apart from the impact of automation and technology, and the cost of bringing up and educating a child for as much as fifteen to twenty years or more of his life without any return, means that the economic grounds for a mutual need of the generations have passed with the times. In short, the economic roles, the obligations and responsibilities, the rewards, even the power relations between the young and the old, are only shadows of the recent past. The powers and responsibilities of each are unclear and tenuous. Indeed, in some respects, the relationships have been completely reversed. A factor which threatens to take from youth its sense of importance and usefulness--its sense of being needed--is threatening vast numbers of the adult society as well, for the automated machine has made all too many able-bodied men in the prime of their lives face an uncertain future of chronic indigence and insecurity.

I was recently in Chicago, where I had spent a quarter of a century and where I have some friends who are intimately connected with the packing industry. They reported the literal passing of Carl Sandburg's Chicago, the hog-butcher of the world. They just don't butcher meat any more in Chicago. Meat is now butchered in Texas, Minnesota, Iowa, and Nebraska. The modern technology of freezing, transportation, automation, and packaging takes meat almost straight from the feedlot into the supermarket, wrapped. This is what has replaced the packing house. Think what this has meant in the past ten years to 40,000 packing house workers who are out of jobs. It is now said conservatively that fully 17,000 of these persons, in the prime of their lives, will, under present conditions and immediate prospects, never work again to the end of their days. They are the permanently indigent, and they are heads of families, and the young people of families. It is also interesting that they turn out to be a particular section of the social body, over-proportionately members of the Negro race; and they are permanent wards of the people, so-to-speak. So we can see the problem as one which encircles us all, for no adult who is insecure as a worker can be secure as a parent. The insecurity of these 17,000 parents is certain to be visited as a secondary and confirming declaration upon their children, if, as is so frequently the case, they are deprived of a meaningful and purposeful place in the social order. It is at just this point that the awesome negative impact of a generation of deprived and alienated youth becomes apparent.

As one writer has observed, modern youth has become the dreaded avenging angel of his parents, since he holds the power to prove his parents' success or failure as parents. And this counts so much more now, since his parents' economic success is no longer so important in the society of abundance. Youth, itself, feeling insecure because of its marginal position in a society that no longer depends upon it for economic survival, is tempted to use the power this reversal between the generations has conferred on him to be acuser and judge of his parents. The whole of society stands accused, in _loco parentis_, as we witness the ubiquitous pattern of rebelliousness in present-day youth. This rebelliousness is manifest, to be sure, in a plurality of ways by different kinds of deviant patterns, including on the one hand, crime and delinquency, on the other hand, radicalists, and still again, Bohemian and specialized beatnick life-styles. But, nevertheless, these patterns are inclusive of the broad reaches and more numerous conventional elements of the whole world of youth. We are becoming increasingly aware of the existence of a variety of sub-cultures which are a product of the problem-solving disposition of human groups when confronted by specific and recurrent life problems. These are in turn a reflection of both the broad encompassing and the narrow and specific changes in the social and economic situation confronting young people in general, and in particular, as members of differentiated cultural economic and racial groups.

Perhaps it would be well to focus in passing upon a few of the revolutionary developments of our time in order to establish the terms and conditions of these sub-cultural developments of our society, and of the emergence of specific social systems of young people in which the spirit of rebellion is manifest. While it is true that only a small percentage of young people participate overtly in acting out the spirit of rebellion, many more are vulnerable and the general spirit of rebellion may well extend to greater numbers. The result may be a profound modification of the traditional patterns of power and authority. This is already indicated by the increasing incidents of attacks upon the police themselves and other symbols of power and authority by young people. Everyone is familiar today with the likely future of great sections of the youthful community which are without jobs. Automation has cut away the whole bottom segment of the job market for an enormous section of the youth of the community. This problem is further aggravated by the increased birth rate which some 17 years ago definitely went upward. Here they are, the products of the increased birth rate knocking at doors which are closed to them. They provide society the occasion to speak about the problem of school drop-outs as though these youngsters were a new kind of creature that plagues us on every score and in every way. The point is that we have not learned how to transform a majority of youth into adults who can perform mental rather than physical labor for hire; and because we have not, we cannot give them a sense of direction which they require as all humans do. I want to share with you the figures on this problem. I suspect that the sociologists, who have been talking to you, have alluded to it as a problem. I also would like to say some things which may be different from the things that may have been touched upon in talks about power structures and changes in the social scene. But I want to be certain that what I have to say relates in a very specific way to these phenomena. And I want to comment on them in a moment or two as they relate to the revolution of our time.

There are several quite distinct and transforming features in contemporary society that have a very special impact on you and that must be our point of departure. I'd like just to mention these in passing. We are all now acquainted through the daily press and through cocktail conversations with the population explosion and with the possibility of "standing room only" at the beginning of the year 2000. But the population explosion is significant already in quite a different way, not so much in terms of numbers, but in the sense of its uneven manifestation. Long before the numbers move in upon us they set in motion a factor of human relations which is quite different from that to which we are accustomed. For the change in numbers, with the great variation--by way of different age and ethnic cultural groups--has created different proportions of the various groups in the total structure and new conditions of interaction of these various groups. There is an uneven impact upon society which has very special significance for us. The point is that America is getting, at the same time, older and younger. As a result of the disproportionate increase in the birth rate and of refinements in our medical technology, the movement from the rural countryside to the city, and the inability of the institutions to deal with these problems, urban living reflects a complex of many shortcomings and disabilities in reference to disadvantaged and marginal groups. All this is linked in life so that there is very rapid acceleration of the increase in population in the upper age groups and in the years of childhood. A society which has more mouths than it has hands is essentially the spectacle of the population explosion. Now of course the question, "Can we really have more mouths than we can have hands?" is immediately pondered as being some kind of a miracle and it really is a miracle of automation, the revolution of technology. But this revolution has permitted the increase in man-hour productivity and so the very few can produce the wants, as far as consumption is concerned, of the very many. It is, of course, the bone of our existence and it is also the bane of our existence, as is evidenced by my reference to the packing-house workers of Chicago. For these workers are considered another group of these former able-bodied producers, turned prematurely into mere consumers. So we have the population revolution; the revolution in technology and the corresponding change in the distribution pattern; and we have the emergence of a metropolitan community with the sifting and the sorting of the population which is quite new and which is characterized by a quite new pattern of human relations. The fact that approximately two-thirds of the population of the United States now live in the shadow of the metropolis suggests that in a single generation a wholesale replacement and new condition of contact and of action on the part of the whole of the population has taken place. This change gives us, then, a new pattern of social relationship, a new pattern of action different from that which characterized the society in the past. It is in this sense that we are living in one of the great population changes in modern history. There is not just an increase in numbers; not just a new distribution of population; but, in fact, a new pattern of human relations.

I should mention, as well, the sense in which this change moves on in unrelenting fashion. The demographers have indicated that in 1940 for every 70 of the population in the age group 25 and under, and 65 and over, there were 100 in the population 25 to 65. By 1960, this ratio had changed to 91 to 100. This is just 20 years now! Ninety-one in the age group under 25 and 65 or over for every 100 in the middle years. And by 1980 it can be conservatively said that there will be more in the age group, 25 and under and 65 and over, than in the age group of 25 to 65. This is significant to the observation that we have more mouths than hands. And whose are these mouths? At the opposite ends of the continuum, they represent the young and the old--the old, passing through, or having passed through their productive years; the young in the condition of consumption with a view to becoming productive, if they are to be productive at all. We are now, post-haste, building schools and hiring teachers and, in some cases, reluctantly lowering standards to keep abreast of the tide. But this is, for the most part, only the most superficial sense in which this latter group confronts us. It confronts us not as a group with a consumption pattern that merely needs more of the same old stuff, but a group that needs to have new stuff, if indeed it is to be able to play a new productive role. If the automated system is to have available, and is to utilize the manpower it requires, then in producing this manpower we need to recognize that mere physical prowess, mere physical energy, will not suffice.

What I said here of the revolution can be generalized in quite another way and I should like again, in passing, to employ this gambit. The first 150 years of our history can be roughly characterized as the melting and the bringing together of persons of different cultures, perspectives, and points of view into an American culture--a new unity of persons. One might call this melting pot a centripetal process of initiating into American society the millions who came out of Europe in the last half of the 19th and the early part of the 20th century. As a matter of fact, the function of the settlement house, the function of the public schools, and the appetite of the population squared with the function of the welfare agencies and the public schools. These new Americans abandoned earlier points of view and took on new ones, in the form of language and in terms of culture and practice. In other words, there was a unifying spirit and quality in the whole fabric of American life, notwithstanding the plurality of the cultures and the backgrounds which distinguished the people who came. In recent years, the process has taken another direction. It has become, so-to-speak, a centrifugal one. The effect of these changes in population and the effect of this revolution in technology is to create local pools of activity and interests which differentiate the purposes, the objectives, and the sense and means of realizing personal well-being of these separate groups--all of this apart from the mission and purpose of the community as a whole. What has emerged is, in effect, a process that is producing sub-cultures rather than molding the sub-cultures into a common American culture. Quite recently, the behavioral sciences as the result of their empirical excursions into the community have been forced to take note of the emergence of sub-cultures of youth, sub-cultures of race, sub-cultures of class. These groups move away from the general theme of the community and pose new and challenging problems to welfare and education. Rather than taking up education and welfare as means of engaging the society, these agencies become processes of rejection and indeed they have become processes of mutual rejection, both by the agencies and by the client of the services which are centered in the agencies. It is perhaps correct to say, more frequently than we realize, that school itself rejects the products of the sub-cultures of youth just as surely as individual members of the sub-cultures are increasingly rejecting the school.

I recently attended a conference at M.I.T. under the auspices of the Office of the Scientific Advisor to the President. The title of the conference was "The Difficult 30 Per Cent in American Education." The conferees were seeing the fact that the time had arrived when it had to be said of the American public school system, from elementary and secondary through university, that a third of the student population had such recurrent, such chronic problems within the school as to be major problems of discipline, of drop-out, of deliquency, or of failure in reading. One in three of the student population has to develop the adaptive solution of graduating from these problems or leaving the school, or of being diverted into some kind of use of his hands in vocationalism. In some fashion or another it is suggested to these students that they really don't belong in school in the sense that the vast majority of students in the past have been served by the schools. So we have the emergence of a society with massive characteristics, a society of impersonality and detachment in the large, but of intimacy and identification within local sub-cultural areas of experience. And correspondingly, there is the eclipse of the formal controls of society as challenged by the informal claims which these sub-cultures have upon individuals. There is antagonism between the children of the slum or of racial groups and police, as well as the general community. At the same time there has been an eclipse of the general condition of consensus of the whole society. Now informal controls are in the area of the local, the primary, the face-to-face experiences of these groups which are at odds with the general society. And so we sometimes even fall into the error of asking, as we comment upon student population, why is it students have no sense of shame and guilt as kids used to have? It somehow seems as if they have become cold, calculating, inhuman agents, without the essential characteristics of the human animal we remember from our youth. But there *is* a sense of shame and guilt. Shame, as we know, reinforces the feeling of guilt in the control of non-conforming behavior; but in the current cultural community of America, the large variety of sub-cultures has made shame and guilt problematic rather than an agency for social control. The shame of these youngsters is in response to the claims on them of the local sub-cultures of which they are a part. It produces non-conformity, rather than conformity to the established norms of the general society. The power of the sub-culture to produce this kind of a reversal of form and commitment is not yet fully appreciated. We are still asking ourselves why it is that we insist that by some kind of formal order or forbidding technique we may be able to put it down. If the policeman's lot in past years has been, as Gilbert and Sullivan observed, an "unhappy one," it is even more unhappy today, in that we subscribe to the notions that we can police a community without having the formal authority supported by these informal systems of control.

So we have a plurality of sub-cultures and the tendencies within society to produce them. I'd like to suggest with reference to a study which we are currently conducting in Los Angeles on adolescent social systems, that there is emerging a central power and influence among young people which our conventional and conditional welfare organizations, for the most part, are not capable of engaging and which put us at odds with them. If you will keep in mind some of the things that I have said, you begin to understand why it is that this subsystem, to which I shall refer, has the content that it has. And I might say that I am not here merely to call your attention to what nearly everyone recognizes; namely, that there are influences which peer groups have that we ought to take note of, and that there are social relationships outside the formal structures of society which should be taken into account. I would go a step further and say that these relationships have such substantive content as to be something that has to be addressed and coped with for they are, under present circumstances, a center of power with reference to the dropout, the undisciplined youngster, the classroom situation, and the degree to which the youngsters are realistically responding to the world about them as it offers them promise or denies them promise. The lives of adolescents and their interests are influenced by a great variety of adult institutions. Many youths are active members of extra-curricular school groups, church-sponsored activities, recreation and park programs, and other youth-serving community programs. The great majority of deliquent acts are not committed by youth who are active participants in such adult-sponsored programs. Of course, some delinquencies are committed by groups which are affiliated with adult agencies. However, such groups are often attached to such agencies in name only. The groups I am talking about are substantially and actually outside adult institutional control. Young people conduct most of their leisure activities on the street or the beaches and are related to each other in what can be observed as a unique social pattern or system. This pattern is broader than, but includes, the typical street-corner gang or crowd of loosely assorted, non-conforming youngsters. The youths who belong to groups which are outside of adult institutions are part of what I refer to as an adolescent system of strength. This system is thought to be the institutional locus of youthful behavior patterns--of the deliquency and/or drinking, and many of the other curious, bohemian and radical ventures which the adult community finds difficult to understand. Only the barest outlines of this development are known today. Many of the variations and characteristics of the different stages of development are clamoring for explanation, for more intensive and more extensive research. We're attempting in some studies now to describe the unique adolescent system, keeping in mind that while many deliquents belong to status groups within the strata, not all of the youth within these groups commit deliquent acts. And yet they are closer, all of them, to these acts than many of us know. I repeat: Deviant behavior may take the form of many different elements but they are in relationships to common conditions and circumstances. Some youths within this system may be involved in delinquency so infrequently or of such a minor character that you cannot term them delinquents at all. So I am not using the word delinquent to refer to youth. I merely refer to it in order to suggest a point about youth in general. Youths are not directly involved in economic and social institutions which influence the lives of their parents. They are influenced rather by the institutional effects of the adult occupational world, the occupational attitudes of their parents, or their school training. In addition, young people have not undergone the broad experiences that affect the lives of their parents. They often are not fully aware of the consequences of the lives they currently lead. Instead, they perceive and interpret life solely from the standpoint of their own youthful consciousness. Instead of organizing these aspirations about conventional factors of occupational or business achievement, youth tend--more than we can understand--to structure their lives around specific styles of dress, around grooming, even around transistor radios, customized cars, drinking, or going steady. And you must keep in mind that there isn't much else that we have left for them. Their interests, however, are important because they are included in many values that do, in substance, serve as teen-age guides to personal worth--the only way, in some respects, in which there is indeed a sense of personal worth. From 7 to 14 years of age, status groups begin to emerge among youth which give preeminent subscription to heterosexual interests or materialistic values. Among these groups, religious activities, school, civic, and family responsibility diminish in value as compared with peer-popularity based upon these several kinds of teen-age interests to which I have referred. By junior high, the system composed of these status-group arrangements begins to differentiate into various stratas and becomes most differentiated in communities of families with considerable variation in occupational and educational backgrounds. In these communities of heterogeneous social class compositions two major adolescent strata, and often an intermediary one, emerge. In relation to the groups within these strata, there are youth who are associated with cliques, crowds and clubs outside the strata. The proportional sizes of these strata vary considerably from community to community. In some communities this system is populated by almost three-quarters of the youth inhabiting the area; in other communities only one-third may be so involved. While there is an overlap between members of the strata system and those outside of it, the majority of conforming youth are not within the specifically defined part of the system. In the main, the lives of more conforming youth are regulated by institutions under adult control. Yet, as these young people are so regulated, they are increasingly empty of a sense of worth or feeling that they have a contribution to make. It is felt that the present absence of personal frustration or mental illness cannot help us comprehend the varities and formation of deviant behavior among youth, or why youngsters affiliate themselves with different institutional relationships. Stable and unstable youth exist within all institutional frameworks. To understand the activities of conforming youth one must see these activities as the effects of norms and values of the institutional context within which young people act out their lives. Such contexts are represented by schools, recreation and social service institutions, as well as certain types of families. We must attempt to utilize specific research methods, it seems to me, to measure and contrast the structures, the norms and values of conforming youth, as contrasted with the adolescents within the unique system of social strata. Let's take a look at the adolescent community. What does it look like from the inside? One can view adolescent relations through the evaluative perceptions of youth within these adolescent social strata. These evaluative perceptions exist in the form of unique adolescent terms. I'm going to give you a few of them. You may find them sort of exotic, but I assure you they are exotic only in this circle. I've gone down into the areas in Los Angeles where we are making a study, and they are not exotic references there. They're true, *bona fide* labels; and the youths classify one another according to these terms. These evaluative perceptions exist in the form of unique terms such as: "soshes," "hodads," "joe-bads," "rinky-dinks," "weirdos," "squares," "brains," and "outsiders." Some of these words I think will come into even your places, but they have come from a place where all of these words represent the insiders' awareness of the major types of youth in their community. The naming process which gave rise to these terms implicitly involves the normative standpoint of those who have created the names. The system which becomes fully elaborated in heterogeneous communities usually contains three major strata. I'd like to describe briefly the names and types of the youth within them. In Los Angeles the members of the upper stratum, the "soshes" are recognized easily. Such boys and girls, in terms of fashion, display Ivy leagues, continentals, tennis shoes, cashmere sweaters, crew-cuts, and such girlish hairstyles as bubbles and gitches. Of course fashions may change at any time, but nevertheless the adolescent values which regulate the selection of these fashions remain the same. It is the substantive subculture inside of which these designations, these appearances, if I may call them that, reflect the existence of norms and values. In contrast the members of the lower stratum refer to themselves in quite different terms. In Los Angeles they are variously called, or call themselves, "joe-bads," "jodaddies," or by the Spanish term, "esse." The dress of lower-class youth is as distinctive as their names. They sport levis, or khakis, usually split at the bottoms. They wear Sir-Guy shirts, taken from the name of a popular manufacturer of sports shirts; and their long hair is meticulously combed back at the sides, the top falling forward in a jelly-roll style, and the back ending in a duck's tail. Their girl friends also have their own distinctive style of dress which might take the form of too long or too short, skin-tight skirts, high-combed ratted hair, tight sweaters, and long hanging ear-rings. If you see one or the other of these in a junior college student body, don't regard them as some kind of a queer or extraordinary messenger from what one does not know, but rather as representatives of a very substantial condition and circumstance within the adolescent community. In areas where both adolescent strata are present, members of each stratum regard contemptuously the fashions which are valued by the other. Also, names are often generated which differentiate the points of view of out-group members from in-group. The "soshes" refer to the "esses" as "rinky-dinks," or "low-lifes." There are a few exceptions to this viewpoint among the "soshes;" the "esses" retort is that all "soshes" are stuck-up "skin-heads," and chicken-hearted. We believe that there are linguistic counterparts of these names in all cities. Often the metaphorical terms that classify members of these social strata change meaning in the context of different situations. A "greaser" is sometimes represented as being interested in cars, or the term refers to minority membership. In addition to the "soshes" and "esses," there are some terms used to describe an intermediate position to the two major social classes. It is difficult to view this as a unique social stratum. When questioned by researchers about their place in the adolescent community, these youngsters point out that they are not outsiders, "weirdos" or "eggheads." When hardpressed for identification, these youth, who claim to be within the adolescent community but not definite members of the major social strata, indicate that they get along with both "soshes" and "esses." They are sort of in-between. Many of these intermediate members also refer to themselves as "low-soshes" who are not in with the popular cliques. These represent, by and large, the overwhelming mass of youngsters. The adolescent social strata seem to be always in flux; and although their members place great value in belonging to one or another part of the system, they still persistently engage in restless and seething maneuvers for positional advantage. At times, status adjustments involve changing major affiliations within the system itself. Those girls or boys who are identified as "flips" move in and out of the "soshe" and the "esse" province. Such changes are prevalent and more acceptable in high school.

The members of the system or strata have normative standpoints which vary from those represented by our adult institutions. Also, there are important variations in values and norms between the strata themselves; and finally, there are important changes in the normative systems that occur over time as the youths grow older. The measurement of these variations is an important focus of some of the studies that we are carrying on.

I won't spend more time on this. I simply want to call to your attention the sense in which there exists for the whole of the adolescent world a substantive content of experience which is a new center of power influencing the direction and nature of adolescent behavior. To express this in a much more pointed way, let me refer to what is happening in certain minority groups. The general context of social change to which I refer, brought on between 1950 and 1960 a great transformation of the composition of population in the major cities of the United States. The 12 largest cities of the United States lost over 2 million of their white residents and gained nearly 2 million

Negro residents in that short ten-year period. When this transformation took place, it reflected a disproportionate change as well in the youth population within those cities. The city of Washington, D.C. today, for example, has a non-white population of over 65 per cent, but the public schools of Washington, D.C., enroll well over 75 per cent non-whites. This phenomenon is true wherever this transformation takes place today. Chicago has a non-white population of about 23 per cent, but the non-white population of the public schools is approaching one-third. The city of St. Louis has one-third of its population non-white, but well over 45 per cent of the public school population of that city is non-white. This is the general pattern of the major metropolitan centers of the United States.

In 1951, one out of every ten children in the twelve largest cities in the United States was identified as culturally disadvantaged by the public schools. They present problems as a result of their background which make it impossible to move them along in the school system at the same pace as the great majority of youngsters. By 1960, this figure had changed from one in ten to one in three. As a matter of fact, projecting the trends as they now appear, without some radical prevention in terms of public policy, it is likely that by 1980 the ratio will be one in two in these major metropolitan centers.

The textbook phrases are "culturally disadvantaged," or "culturally deprived," but I think these are mistakes. The youth may be culturally disadvantaged in the perspective of the school culture and from the point of view of the middle-class society and what it is about. But these young people have a culture, and the culture is indicated by these sub-cultural environments and contents that are generally shown in the sub-culture of adolescents and specifically shown in the sub-culture of the Negro, the Mexican-American, the low-income groups, and lower-class families. So what are referred to as culturally disadvantaged and culturally deprived are the groups which do not exhibit the culture of the predominant society which is perhaps best symbolized by the influence and power that signifies the middle classes in our society. The sub-cultures represent the ways in which people seek to solve their problems--problems that they have experienced in meeting life situations. These groups have made a life under conditions of self-denial that have depended on the social transformations to which I have referred.

One might ask what kind of a new problem is this, or is it a new problem at all. The numbers themselves indicate that it _is_ truly a new problem. It is a new problem not alone in the sense that those in the sub-cultures have to be educated to perform tasks, but they are of such numbers as to present an essential threat to our democracy. These individuals represent an apathetical orientation. Furthermore, there is more anti-intellectualism in the sub-cultures than we can afford to risk. There is prejudice and intolerance and corresponding hostility and antagonism between the groups that develop as a result of these sub-cultural orientations. There is a narrowness of thought that flaunts itself in the face of the economic inter-independence which has become such a condition of modern society. Thus, these groups are a center of power with negative consequences for the whole of society.

Let me say a word or two, at this point, about the formation of the culture for these groups because I think there is too often the notion that the press, radio, television have in some sense not been of sufficient quality to lift these people. But this is to miss the point, for culture is not acquired in this way. It is primarily determined not by words and symbols, but by relationships among people. Culture is forged out of the interaction of groups with each other over long periods of time. In reference to the groups we are discussing here is a culture of deprivation. The culture of deprivation of young people today develops because they are not wanted, not needed. They must find some meaning for life and some acceptance of themselves--some sense of self-achievement--which is denied them in the circles of the adult community. And if many of us have been quick to understand the need for giving Negroes a substitute for low self-esteem--namely, high self-esteem, we will, if we are wise, develop insight into what is happening to youth in this regard. Youth generally is related to the adult community in such ways as to develop low self-esteem rather than to conceive itself as important and significant. And the low self-esteem which these young people have is a function of the sense in which they cannot find within the adult community meaningful recognition. Therefore, they must compensate for it by developing within their own social stratum attidudes, norms, and values which do give them a sense of worth and importance. And more frequently than is good for the society, if I may say so, this turns out to be a condition of defiance, a condition of rebellion rather than a condition of identification with the adult social framework. So the deprived or disadvantaged young people of our time, in increasing numbers, can be seen as not only reflecting directly the main culture of the society as we mediate it to them through welfare and the schools, but indirectly as demonstrating a cultural self-image which is derived from the main culture but which is, in fact, a "contra-culture" representing rebellion and opposition to the dominant ways of life, getting its full meaning and expression by identification with these sub-cultures. On picket lines at San Francisco hotels or in gang groups in the alleys and byways of the slums, what is derived is a kind of behavior that is in reaction to the rejection of the wider community or the non-acceptance by you of these sub-cultural roles. This is, in my judgment, the common quality of the sub-cultures and their effects on the delinquent gang or the group that joins the movement. They demonstrate against the wider society because some of their ideals and norms do not fit what they are led to believe the society should embody. On the other hand, the militant nationalism of the Muslim sect takes an oppositional position to the whole scheme of our life.

One added thought about this problem of the sub-cultures as centers of power is to suggest that, among other things, they do not include necessarily factors which we prize in the wider society. The sub-culture of the adolescent increasingly runs counter to the culture of the school. In these sub-cultures there is less interest in knowledge for its own sake than in represented in the adult community and in the schools. As a matter of fact, interest in knowledge for its own sake is not represented in the developing sub-culture of the adolescent world. For there is a pragmatic anti-intellectualism which is pervading the life of young people today. This is most clearly expressed in the dilemma of the Negro. Why go to school to learn to do that for which you cannot and will not be sought? Why take on all these interests and activities that will not have any pay-off in the places in which you will one day find yourself? These questions suggest a very pragmatic self-counselling in terms of the norms, the values, and the ideas of the broader society. Education in these sub-cultures, and increasingly among young people, is not seen as an opportunity for self-expression or self-realization. School is seen, rather, as a place where you will disorient yourself with reference to the realities, the practical eventualities of the world about you. Education is not seen as serving non-vocational purposes, and so you do get from education--if it is real education--the education of experience. And even that vocational education which is not capable of producing an effective worker is merged with all the other kinds of esoteric education which has no significance whatsoever for them. The point is that we have placed our young people in a position, in the context of these changing times, of seeing the world as full of material things to be manipulated; and they are concerned with the ways and means by which they can be manipulated. This knowledge is more generously supplied to their own collective ventures through the developing of their own subcultures than through the formal devices of the agencies and institutions representing the adult community.

The lives of our young people today are essentially physical and non-symbolic. In other respects they have a pervasive sense of being powerless, and so they respond to those things which give them power; these things, indeed, are the stuff of their careers as they forge them for themselves. More than we realize, our educational structures today are subtly refusing to face-up to this condition of young people. Again, it is illustrated dramatically with reference to the Negro, for the fact is that de facto segregation can be even more consequential with reference to the isolation and estrangement of Negro youth than the formal segregation which was put aside with the repeal of such laws. The facts of life suggest to him the hypocrisy, the insincerity of the verbalisms which the wider community affords him. And young people have similar reactions to the verbalisms and the hypocrisy of adults generally. Our systems have reflected in a discriminatory fashion the attitudes of the general community toward the Negro even as we have formally regarded these systems as being non-discriminatory and accepting of the Negro. The patronizing attitudes of counselling, the condescending views of reducing standards and norms so that persons can have successes, the provision of specifically tailored opportunities all are ways of reinforcing a system of exclusion and denial. These groups have ways of reinforcing a system of exclusion and denial. These groups have become aware and extremely sensitive to this system. As a consequence of this, there is a playback on their cultures of an added force which further alienates and estranges them from the general community.

I think, perhaps, I've said as much as I ought to by way of provoking you to some questions. I did want to suggest that we are living at a time in which the problem of deprivation of young people in general, and specific elements within the youth community in particular, take a much more subtle form than merely the absence or presence of material conditions. For what I've been talking about is not that young people are denied some kind of material experience or opportunity that presents us with a problem which can be redressed by merely giving them some kind of physical goods or stuff. But rather that their environments have engendered for them a secondary and more important controlling influence in their lives. These mean conditions, these objective relationships, these changing patterns have generated within these young people problem-solving answers to new conditions so that negative environmental conditions are not the whole any longer of the problems that confronts us. They are not the same as the cultures of the groups who are experiencing these conditions. The sub-cultures of youth, sub-cultures of the minority, are the ways in which these young people have coped with these conditions. And the sub-cultures have positive elements in them which compensate for the low self-esteem evident in the way in which the larger society regards them. Therefore, these cultures become centers of power and influence with reference to behavior and with reference to general commitments in the community.

I think the time has come when we must re-double interest and effort to set forth the terms and conditions of the lives of contemporary youths and the cultures which they represent--for only in the face of this understanding, it seems to me, will we be effective in bringing about some educational impact or degree of communication that can make the kind of difference that we hope to make.

I'm reminded at this point of the story which may summarize this all. Maybe one or two of you have heard it, but I think those of you who haven't will find it worth hearing: It is a story of a lion-hunter and illustrates our difficulties in really understanding one another and that all that I have said may fail because it may not have been effectively communicated.

The lion-hunter went to Africa to get his lion. He was a good marksman; but never having hunted lions before, he was much disturbed about what would happen if he missed the animal when it was his turn to shoot. Do lions then jump on the hunter and maul him or what? The hunter became more and more apprehensive as the time approached for that eventful day. At long last he went out and got involved with the lion and that which he feared happened. His knees trembled; his hands shook; and consequently his gun jammed. So he dropped to his knees, closed his eyes, lifted his voice in prayer to the heavens above. Pray he did, mightily. And after a time, during which nothing had happened, he kind of opened one eye and there stood the lion, also in a posture of prayer. So he shouted "Hallelujah!" With his hands up to Heaven he said, "It's wonderful that we obviously believe in the same, true living God; we can talk this thing over." The lion looked at him and said, "Yes, I'm saying grace, what are you doing?"

Young people today are not quite certain as to what we are about in our schools and in our welfare programs. I am inclined to believe that when we say that we do them good and wish them well, we fail to recognize these cultures which have developed and which shape their values. They see us as only saying grace. The problem of mutual rejection is of such proportions as to call for radical reexamination of the traditional structures of education in the United States. I think there is a major crisis in education, and not the least important aspect of this crisis is at the level of the junior college. Here, perhaps, is to be found a significant group of youngsters who have not dropped by the board. You can engage these masses of young people, or the subcultures embracing them, to such a degree as to instruct us in how to win and keep greater numbers of them. We've had experiences in few places in doing this by means of some innovated techniques and procedures. It has been very encouraging, and I am sure that the universities and colleges will see this and will look to the junior colleges as laboratories for the real engagement through better understanding of what the young people bring to our institutions by way of background and preparation from their own problem-solving experiences.